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EQUAL MANAGEMENT REVISITED: 1979
LEGISLATIVE MODIFICATIONS OF THE 1978
MATRIMONIAL REGIMES LAW
Katherine S. Spaht* and Cynthia Samuel**
Despite the many controversies surrounding the "equal manage-
ment" reform of Louisiana's matrimonial regimes law in 1978, all
must concede that at least Act 627 did not burst forth upon the
state like a fiery women's libber out of control. To the relief of
many, equal management emerged from the 1978 legislature more
like a debutante entering society under the cautious restraint of her
parents. The effective date of Act 627 was postponed until after the
1979 legislative session' to allow the legislature another opportunity
to make any adjustments deemed necessary once the public had had
a look at its progeny. Furthermore, the legislature by concurrent
resolution ordained serious chaperonage during the period between
the 1978 and 1979 sessions by the Louisiana State Law Institute, the
Louisiana State Bar Association, and the Joint Legislative Subcom-
mittee on Matrimonial Regimes and its Advisory Committee.2 The
primary responsibility for proposing refinements during the interim
study period was delegated to the Law Institute. The Institute com-
pletely revised and reorganized Act 627, while endeavoring, in ac-
cordance with the concurrent resolution,' to preserve the policy
decisions embodied in the Act. The Law Institute revision was con-
tained in five separate bills which were presented to the Joint
Legislative Subcommittee for approval in March and April. The five
bills, with some alterations approved by the Subcommittee, were
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University; member of Advisory
Committee to Joint Legislative Subcommittee Revising Louisiana's Community Prop-
erty Laws; author of the Classification and Termination sections of this article.
**Assistant Professor of Law, Tulane University; member of Advisory Committee
to Joint Legislative Subcommittee Revising Louisiana's Community Property Laws;
author of the Matrimonial Agreements and Management sections of this article.
1. 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 9.
2. La. H.R. Con. Res. No. 232, 4th Reg. Sess. (1978). See Spaht, Interim Study
Year, 39 LA. L. REV. 551 (1979).
3. La. H.R. Con. Res. No. 232, 4th Reg. Sess. (1978) provides:
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Louisiana Law Institute is author-
ized and directed to review the provisions of House Bill No. 1569, the statutes and
codes of the state of Louisiana and to make such recommendations, proposals, and
codifications as it deems necessary to achieve the policy objectives set forth in
House Bill No. 1569 by the Legislature and to review proposed legislation which
may be prepared pursuant to this resolution for the purpose of assuring that such
proposed legislation utilizes the style and semantics appropriate for inclusion in
the Civil Code and the statutes.
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then introduced at the 1979 legislative session.' Ultimately, the
legislature enacted three of the original five bills: (1) Act 709, con-
sisting of almost all of the revised articles on matrimonial regimes;
(2) Act 710, concerning the marital portion; and (3) Act 711, contain-
ing amendments to the Civil Code, Code of Civil Procedure, and
Revised Statutes coordinating other related provisions of law with
the changes in matrimonial regimes law accomplished in Act 709.
Companion bills establishing the procedure for an administration of
community property upon termination of the regime' and
establishing a central registry for matrimonial agreements e were not
enacted. Thus, on January 1, 1980, when the 1979 acts take effect,'
including the repeal of Act 627 of 1978,8 equal management, dressed
in a new legislative wardrobe, will make its final bid for acceptance.
This article will be devoted to a discussion of the major dif-
ferences between Act 627 of 1978 and Act 709 of 1979, since the
details and effects of the initial equal management reform have
already received ample attention in the Louisiana Law Review
Symposium on Act 627.1 Additionally, the authors will comment on
problems that remain unresolved by Act 709, despite the opportunity
to arrive at solutions during the interim study year. Proper
documentation of legislative history is difficult in Louisiana since
there are no verbatim records of legislative committee or floor
debates. In the case of the 1979 acts, at least four bodies were of-
ficially charged with suggesting revisions; thus, accurate documenta-
tion is especially difficult. The official comments by the Law In-
stitute that accompany the acts are often helpful in understanding
4. La. H.B. No.798, 5th Reg. Sess. (1979) (matrimonial regimes); La. H.B. No.
799, 5th Reg. Sess. (1979) (marital portion); La. H.B. No. 800, 5th Reg. Sess. (1979)
(amendments coordinating reform with Civil Code, Code of Civil Procedure, and Revis-
ed Statutes); La. H.B. No. 801, 5th Reg. Sess. (1979) (procedure for administration of
community property); La. H.B. No. 802, 5th Reg. Sess. (1979) (central registry of
matrimonial agreements).
5. La. H.B. No. 801, 5th Reg. Sess. (1979).
6. La. H.B. No. 802, 5th Reg. Sess. (1979).
7. 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 13. Section 10 of Act 709, concerning spouses mar-
ried under the old legal regime, became effective August 1, 1979. See text at note 157,
infra.
8. 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 5. This repealing section is not effective until
January 1, 1980. 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 13. However, part of Act 627, permitting
spouses to make both matrimonial regime contracts and other contracts during mar-
riage, became effective sixty days after the end of the 1979 legislative session. 1978
La. Acts, No. 627, § 9. Thus, until the repealer takes effect on January 1, 1980, spouses
are technically free to contract according to Act 627's terms, which are less restrictive
in the area of matrimonial regime contracts than the terms of Act 709 of 1979. See
text at notes 126-31, infra. The authors are certain that the failure to repeal a part of
Act 627 was inadvertent, and urge caution with respect to reliance on an obvious over-
sight by the legislature.
9. Community Property Symposium, 39 LA. L. REV. 323 (1979).
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the application of the new law and its relation to other parts of the
Civil Code. However, the comments, as expressions of legislative in-
tent, should be approached with caution, for all three of the 1979
acts specifically state that the comments are not intended to be con-
sidered part of the law nor are they enacted into law. '" The authors
were present at all of the formal meetings of the bodies officially
concerned with the revision of Act 627, as well as in attendance at
the 1979 legislative committee hearings and floor debates when revi-
sion of Act 627 was discussed. Where necessary to clarify the mean-
ing of Act 709, the authors have relied upon their recollections of
the discussions and debates, in spite of the impossibility of pro-
viding proper documentation. The authors hope that even an un-
documented explanation will be more useful to the reader than none.
ORIENTATION OF 1979 ACTS WITHIN CIVIL CODE
Act 709 of 1979 repeals, as did Act 627 of 1978, book three, title
six of the Louisiana Civil Code, comprising the articles on marriage
contracts," donations made in consideration of marriage,"2 dowry,'8
the marital portion," paraphernal property, 6 the legal regime of
community of acquets or gains,'6 and judicial separation of property
during marriage." Of the repealed articles, the only ones that
neither act attempted to replace were those articles governing
dowry and donations made in consideration of marriage. As to the
latter, replacement was unnecessary because elsewhere in the Civil
Code there are articles on donations to and between persons con-
templating marriage which adequately deal with the subject.'8 The
10. 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 7; 1979 La. Acts, No. 710, § 5; 1979 La. Acts, No.
711, § 6. Cf. 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 10 (comments reflect intent of legislature). There
are several instances in which the comments to Act 709 of 1979 go beyond the text of
the articles and indicate policy choices that may not in fact have been discussed or
made. See note 18, infra. See text at note 376, infra. The Law Institute is currently
editing the official comments, as it is authorized by statute to do, for publication by
West Publishing Company. Any discrepancy between the comments referred to in this
article and those appearing later in West's publication is due to editorial change.
11. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2324-35, 2392-96 & 2424, repealed by 1979 La. Acts, No.
709, § 1 [hereinafter cited as LA. CIv. CODE (repealed 1979)]. See LA. R.S. 9:2831-34 &
2856, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1, repealed by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 5
[hereinafter cited as LA. R.S. (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979)].
12. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2336 (repealed 1979).
13. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2337-82 (repealed 1979).
14. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2382 (repealed 1979).
15. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2382-91 (repealed 1979).
16. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2399-423 (repealed 1979).
17. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2425-37 (repealed 1979).
18. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1734-55. See also LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1535 & 1888, as
amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 711. These articles relax certain general restrictions on
donations inter vivos for donations made by "marriage contract." At the time of their
1979]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
repeal of the dowry articles, though bemoaned by ardent preserva-
tionists, will create difficulties only in the extremely unlikely event
that there exist today married women with dowries. The dowry has
outlived its usefulness as a method for providing benefits to the hus-
band with commensurate protection for the wife. Today a parent or
other person seeking to bestow on the spouses the benefits and pro-
tections associated with a dowry can do so with greater flexibility
through a trust.'9
The revised matrimonial regimes law under Act 709 is inserted
into the Civil Code; whereas, Act 627 had positioned the matrimonial
regimes reform in the Civil Code Ancillaries of the Revised
Statutes. ° Under Act 709, the revised articles are located, as were
the old Civil Code articles, at the beginning of the obligations provi-
sions pertaining to nominate contracts. The location of the articles
on matrimonial regimes, which is the same as that of the French and
Quebec Civil Codes,2' emphasizes the ability of the spouses to
regulate their marital property according to an express contract.
Only in default of such express contracts will the law provide a
system for regulating the spouses' ownership and management of
property. However, since a majority of couples marry without ex-
ecuting a contract and hence are governed by the legal regime, it
might have been more realistic to place the articles on matrimonial
regimes among those regulating marriage generally.' For example,
the 1977 Draft Civil Code of Quebec proposes to include the articles
on matrimonial regimes in the title on marriage.23 If the articles on
matrimonial regimes were included among those governing marriage
enactment, these articles contemplated, only antenuptial marriage contracts; however,
both Act 627 and Act 709 permit marriage contracts (or "matrimonial agreements" as
they are called by Act 709) to be made during as well as before marriage. See note 47,
infra. Query whether the relaxed donations rules apply to postnuptial marriage con-
tracts. The authors do not recall any debate on this issue. The determination of the ex-
tent to which the marital relationship is to be favored by relaxing the regular dona-
tions rules for donations to or between the spouses is clearly one of policy and not
merely one of drafting. Yet, comment (c) to article 2328 and comment (c) to article 2329
of Act 709 state that articles 1734-55, employing the term "marriage contract," are ap-
plicable to antenuptial agreements only. Likewise, article 1888 was amended without
discussion to provide that "a future succession may become the object of an antenup-
tial matrimonial agreement," whereas the article previously used the term "marriage
contract." LA. CIv.- CODE art. 1888, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 711.
19. See generally LA. R.S. 9:1721-2252 (Supp. 1964).
20. 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 1; 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1.
21. See C. Civ. arts. 1387-581 (Fr.); CODE CIVIL arts. 1257-450 (Que.). See Baade,
Marriage Contracts in French and Spanish Louisiana: A Study in Notarial
Jurisprudence, 53 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1978).
22. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 119-31.
23. 1 CIVIL CODE REVISION OFFICE, 1977 DRAFT CIVIL CODE OF QUEBEC, REPORT ON
THE QUEBEC CIVIL CODE 67-99.
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generally, it would be necessary to create a new chapter. The Civil
Code articles which appear in chapter five of book one" regulate the
personal effects of marriage, which may not be altered by agree-
ment of the parties.25 The new chapter which could contain the ar-
ticles on matrimonial regimes would regulate the patrimonial effects
of marriage, which may be derogated from by contract of the par-
ties. Either location appears sensible. Apparently, the legislature
chose to emphasize the availability of a contractual regime, however
infrequently spouses may take advantage of it.
Act 710, providing for the marital portion, formerly a single arti-
cle in the chapter on dowry, creates a new chapter four of title six
on "matrimonial regimes."' Since the marital portion, unlike the
legal regime, cannot be waived or altered by the spouses' agree-
ment,2 8 the articles regulating it properly belong among the articles
on marriage, not among the articles governing nominate contracts.
The marital portion articles were added to the title on matrimonial
regimes because the jurisprudence has regarded the marital portion
as an incident of any matrimonial regime. Analysis of the substance
of the marital portion articles is beyond the scope of this article.
However, the authors do not recall any meaningful legislative
debate on the substance of the revised martial portion articles. They
were presented to the legislative committes as embodying present
law and jurisprudence, although, as the comments to Act 710 admit,
the new articles in one instance overrule jurisprudences and in two
instances supplement prior law."
The choice of law provisions, formerly appearing in the Civil
Code with the articles governing the legal regime,2 were inserted
into article 10 of the Civil Code, which contains other choice of law
rules." As the comments to Civil Code article 10 in Act 711 of 1979
indicate, the revised rules derogate, as did the choice of law rules in
Act 627,' from former article 2400 of the Civil Code. Article 2400, if
24. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 119-20.
25. See, e.g., Favrot v. Barnes, 332 So. 2d 873 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
26. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2382 (repealed 1979).
27. 1979 La. Acts, No. 710.
28. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2330, added by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 1 [hereinafter cited
as LA. CiV. CODE (Supp. 1979)].
29. Succession of Lichtentag, 363 So. 2d 706 (La. 1978). See LA. CIv. CODE art.
2433, comment (a) (Supp. 1979).
30. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2434, comment (d), added by 1979 La. Acts, No. 710.
31. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2436, comment (a), added by 1979 La. Acts, No. 710
(establishing new three-year prescription); LA. CIv. CODE art. 2435, added by 1979 La.
Acts, No. 710 (requiring surviving spouse to deduct from marital portion payments
received as a result of death of other spouse).
32. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2400-01 (repealed 1979).
33. LA. CIV. CODE art. 10, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 711.
34. LA. R.S. 9:2836 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979).
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taken literally, would have applied Louisiana's matrimonial regimes
law to movables situated in Louisiana acquired by a
non-domiciliary. 5 In contrast, article 10 now provides that only im-
movables situated in Louisiana and movables owned by Louisiana
domiciliaries are subject to Louisiana's matrimonial regimes law."
MATRIMONIAL AGREEMENTS
General Provisions
The general provisions of both Act 627 of 1978 and Act 709 of
1979 begin by similarly defining "matrimonial regime" as the rules
governing the ownership and management of the property of mar-
ried persons as between themselves and as to third persons. 7 Both
acts contain the general rule that matrimonial regimes may be
established by contract between the spouses, as well as by operation
of law. 8 Act 627 did so by saying that the spouses could adopt a
matrimonial regime of their choice by contract. 9 Act 709, however,
confusingly states that "a matrimonial agreement is a contract
establishing a regime of separation of property or modifying or ter-
minating the legal regime."0 If the "matrimonial agreement" is
simply the contract by which a matrimonial regime is established,
the definition is redundant, for once the Act has defined
"matrimonial regime," it is unnecessary to define further the object
of the kind of contract. If, on the other hand, a "matrimonial agree-
ment" is intended to be a contract by which only certain
35. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2400 (repealed 1979) provided:
All property acquired in this state by non-resident married persons, whether
the title thereto be in the name of either the husband or wife, or in their joint
names, shall be subject to the same provisions of law which regulate the com-
munity of acquets and gains between citizens of this state.
36. 1979 La. Acts, No. 711, amending LA. CIV. CODE art. 10. The fourth paragraph
states that immovables situated in this state are "subject to the legal regime of ac-
quets and gains .... What was actually meant was that the immovables are subject
to all of the laws regulating matrimonial regimes, not just the laws of the legal regime.
Thus, if a non-domiciliary spouse has a matrimonial regime contract that is not repug-
nant to Louisiana's laws, the matrimonial regime contract, not the legal regime, should
govern the ownership of the immovable situated in Louisiana. See LA. CIV. CODE art.
10, comment (b), as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 711.
37. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2325 (Supp. 1979); LA. R.S. 9:2831 (Supp. 1978) (repealed
1979).
Act 709 defines matrimonial regimes in terms of "property," whereas Act 627 had
used the words "assets and liabilities." But, since comment (b) to new article 2325
states that the word "property" as used in that article includes "assets and liabilities,"
the two definitions are practically identical.
38. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2326 (Supp. 1979); LA. R.S. 9:2832 (Supp. 1978) (repealed
1979).
39. LA. R.S. 9:2832 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979). The matrimonial regime contract
was subject to limitations.
40. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2328 (Supp. 1979).
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matrimonial regimes may be established, the definition fails to con-
vey that meaning. By permitting both separation of property and
modification of the legal regime of the community of acquets or
gains," it seems not to exclude any kind of matrimonial regime from
the spouses' choice. The confusion is apparently the result of a
House floor amendment' that shows insufficient appreciation of the
necessity in Civil Code revision for internal consistency of the ar-
ticles. Since the source provisions for Act 709's definition of
"matrimonial agreement" are stated to be four Civil Code articles"
and Act 627 of 1978,'" none of which restrict the kind of matrimonial
regime that can be adopted by contract, it is most likely that the
legislature intended a "matrimonial agreement" to be nothing more
than the name given to a contract establishing any matrimonial
regime. Hence, anyone seeking limitations on the content or confec-
tion of a matrimonial agreement will find no ammunition in the
definition provided by act 709.
The awkwardness in the definition of "matrimonial agreement"
foreshadows more significant divergences between the two acts con-
cerning the spouses' freedom to make matrimonial agreements. Act
627 permitted spouses to make or modify matrimonial agreements
before or during marriage." The freedom to make or modify the
agreement during marriage, together with the elimination of the
ban against interspousal contracts generally, was one of the most
significant alterations of the old law.' To those who enacted Act
41. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2327 (Supp. 1979).
42. The recommendations of the Louisiana State Law Institute and the engrossed
version of House Bill 798 that was proposed on the House floor for passage read: "A
matrimonial agreement is a contract establishing a matrimonial regime or excluding,
modifying, or terminating the legal regime." LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, RECOM-
MENDATION ON REVISION OF ACT 627 OF 1978, proposed LA. CIV. CODE art. 2328 (submit-
ted March 22, 1979 to Joint Legislative Subcommittee on Matrimonial Regimes)
[hereinafter cited as RECOMMENDATION]; La. H.B. No. 798 (engrossed version), proposed
LA. CIv. CODE art. 2328, 5th Reg. Sess. (1979). The reengrossed version after passage
by the House read as quoted in the text.
43. Such lack of appreciation by the legislature of code draftsmanship is par-
ticularly regrettable where this Act is concerned, since one of the legislature's stated
purposes in authorizing review of Act 627 was to make sure the legislation utilized
"the style and semantics appropriate for inclusion in the Civil Code and the statutes."
La. H.R. Con. Res. No. 232, 4th Reg. Sess. (1978).
44. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2325, 2329, 2332 & 2424 (repealed 1979).
45. LA. R.S. 9:2832 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979).
46. LA. R.S. 9:2834 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979).
47. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329 (repealed 1979) (no alteration of matrimonial
agreement during marriage). Act 627 had provided that the Civil Code's matrimonial
regimes provisions, including article 2329, would be repealed on January 1, 1980. 1978
La. Acts, No. 627, § 9. However, Act 709, effective January 1, 1980, repeals both-the
codal provisions and Act 627. 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 13. Therefore, it is Act 709, and
not Act 627, which technically effects the repeal of article 2329. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1790
1979]
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627, the desirability of contractual freedom to make or modify
matrimonial agreements during marriage outweighed the danger of
one spouse taking advantage of the other. This danger was lessened,
since under Act 627, matrimonial agreements could, like any con-
tract, be avoided for a vice of consent 8 and the spouses could not
alter the marital portion." Likewise, freedom of contract was
thought not to present a real threat to creditors, who were pro-
tected by Act 627's requirement of recordation of matrimonial
agreements"0 and by actions already given them by the Civil Code to
set aside prejudicial contracts of their debtors. 1 Nor were forced
heirs threatened, as they retained their right to reduce any ex-
cessive donations contained in the matrimonial agreement.2 The
same freedom to make or modify matrimonial regimes before and
during marriage appeared in both matrimonial regime bills introduced
in the 1977 legislative session," including the Louisiana State Law
Institute's "two funds" bill.
In contrast to Act 627, Act 709 places procedural limitations
upon the making or the modification of a matrimonial regime con-
tract during marriage and adds limitations on the content of these
agreements, whether executed prior to or during marriage. Both the
procedural and substantive limitations were the recommendations of
the Law Institute. Article 2329 of Act 709 contains the procedural
limitation: "Spouses may modify or terminate a matrimonial regime
during marriage only upon joint petition and a finding by the court
that this serves their best interests and that they understand the
governing principles and rules." The requirement of court approval
did not appear in the Law Institute Council's original revision of the
(as it appeared prior to 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 3) (incapacity of husband and wife to
contract with each other). Section 3 of Act 627, which amended article 1790, became ef-
fective sixty days after final adjournment of the 1979 session. 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, §
9. Act 709's repeal of Act 627, however, does not become effective until January 1,
1980. 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 13. Act 627's version of article 1790 has been included
in Act 711, whose effective date is also January 1, 1980. 1979 La. Acts, No. 711, §§ 1 &
8. Thus, while Act 627 did in fact amend this article, after January 1, 1980, the amend-
ment is attributable to Act 711, and not Act 627.
48. LA. R.S. 9:2834, comment (b) (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979) stated: "A
matrimonial regime contract is subject to the general rules of conventional obligations
except as specifically provided in this Title."
49. LA. R.S. 9:2833 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979).
50. LA. R.S. 9:2834 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979).
51. E.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1968-94 (the revocatory action). See LA. R.S. 9:2834,
comment (b) (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979).
52. LA. R.S. 9:2834, comment (b) (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979). Act 627 also pro-
vided that the spouses could not by their matrimonial regime contract alter the
established order of succession. LA. R.S. 9:2833 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979).
53. La. H.B. No. 783, proposed LA. R.S. 9:2833, 3d Reg. Sess. (1977) (Law
Institute's "two funds" bill); La. H.B. No. 1278, 3d Reg. Sess. (1977) ("equal manage-
ment" bill).
[Vol. 40
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general provisions of Act 627." The Council was moved, however, to
reconsider its original action by the written motion of a member
who was concerned that "modification of the legal community by a
matrimonial agreement will result in many nonworking spouses having
little or no ownership interest in assets or income that would form
part of the community under the legal regime. This would lead to
substantial weakening of the community concept."56 The motion
made clear that the concern in allowing spouses to enter into
matrimonial agreements was solely for the welfare of the spouse
whose contributions to the marriage were largely non-economic, and
not for the interest of creditors or forced heirs. The solution proposed
by the motion was to require that a modification or termination of a
matrimonial regime during marriage be in the best interest of the
family and have court approval. The result of this motion was the
Law Institute's final recommendation to the Joint Subcommittee
that the law provide as follows: At any time during marriage, the
spouses can subject themselves by matrimonial agreement to the
legal regime, but any other voluntary change of a matrimonial
regime during marriage can only be made for good cause and with
court approval.57 The recommendation for court approval was re-
jected by the Joint Subcommittee, which adhered to its previous
position, the original position of the Law Institute, that contractual
changes in a matrimonial regime during marriage required no
special procedural safeguard. Thus, the bill was introduced without
any requirement of judicial approval." On the floor of the House, the
requirement of court approval was added to the bill by amendment,59
and after amendments were made by the Senate and concurred in
by the House, the enacted version of article 2329, quoted previously,
required court approval for contractual changes to a matrimonial
regime during marriage. Only the contractual change during mar-
riage from another regime to the legal regime was exempted from
this court approval requirement.
Since the requirement of court approval went in and out of the
bill as if caught in a revolving door, it is not surprising that the new
legislation is inconsistent in its attitude toward spousal over-
reaching. First, Act 709 exempts prospective spouses altogether
from the requirement of court approval as regards their antenuptial
54. Louisiana State Law Institute, Articles Approved by Law Institute Council,
proposed LA. CIV. CODE art. 2331 (December 15-16, 1978).
55. Written Motion to Reconsider Previous Council Action at 2, Submitted by
Frank P. Simoneaux; seconded by A.N. Yiannopoulos and Jack Caldwell.
56. Id. at 3-5.
57. RECOMMENDATION, supra note 42, proposed LA. CIv. CODE art. 2329.
58. La. H.B. No. 798 (original version), 5th Reg. Sess. (1979).
59. La. H.B. No. 798 (reengrossed version), 5th Reg. Sess. (1979).
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matrimonial agreement," exempts spouses married out of state from
the court approval requirement as regards a matrimonial agreement
made within a year of moving to Louisiana," exempts spouses who
married and established the legal regime prior to January 1, 1980
from the necessity of court approval for matrimonial agreements
made prior to January 1, 1980,82 and exempts from the court ap-
proval requirement spouses changing to the legal regime by
matrimonial agreement." In the situations encompassed by the ex-
emptions, overreaching by one of the parties is as great a possibility
as in those situations not exempted. The less-worldly party is not
necessarily any better able to defend himself or herself from a
disastrous matrimonial agreement before getting married than after
the ceremony, before having lived in Louisiana one year than after
this period of residency, or before January 1, 1980 than after that
date. Likewise, a change to the legal regime, which does not require
court approval, may not always be in the interest of the less-worldly
spouse, as when an antenuptial agreement, carefully planned with
the aid of the parents to protect the less-worldly spouse, is upset by
a change to the legal regime. Furthermore, Act 709 permits
matrimonial agreements to be made by an act under private
signature duly acknowledged by the spouses, as well as by an
authentic act," whereas Act 627 required the solemn formalities of
an authentic act."' An acknowledgment of the execution of a con-
tract, unlike an authentic act, does not entail the customary reading
or paraphrasing by the notary of the act's contents to the parties in
the presence of the witnesses. 6 The acknowledgment is thus not as
likely as is an authentic act to alert a spouse to the seriousness of
what he is doing. It is, therefore, surprising that the lesser for-
malities are permitted in legislation which, in its other provisions, is
concerned with spousal overreaching. 7 Finally, neither court ap-
proval nor any formality whatsoever is necessary for the renuncia-
tion by a spouse of the right to concur in transactions for which the
legal regime requires concurrence or for the renunciation by a
spouse of the right to participate in a community business.8 Even
60. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2329 (Supp. 1979).
61. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2329 (Supp. 1979).
62. 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 10.
63. -LA. CIv. CODE art. 2339 (Supp. 1979).
64. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2331 (Supp. 1979).
65. LA. R.S. 9:2834 (Supp. 1978) (repealed' 1979).
66.. Compare M. WOODWARD, WOODWARD'S LOUISIANA NOTARIAL MANUAL § 3.16 (2d
ed. 1962) with id. at § 2.09.
67. The availability of an acknowledged act for matrimonial agreements also
creates a booby-trap where donations are concerned. If any donations are contained in
a matrimonial agreement thus executed, they may be null for improper form. See LA.
CIV. CODE art. 1536.
68. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2348 (Supp. 1979).
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though the renunciation can only cover particular property, 9 it may
constitute a significant alteration of a spouse's rights. Nonetheless,
no court supervision is required in this instance by Act 709. In other
areas, the law has steadily become less protective of the less-
worldly spouse. For example, the law no longer prevents a wife
from obligating herself for her husband's benefit," or a spouse from
donating to the other spouse present or future things71 or, by virtue
of other legislation passed in the 1979 session, from contracting with
the other spouse generally as to present or future things. With
such devices available to the unscrupulous spouse, can the
legislature believe that the less-worldly spouse is any safer because
a judge must approve a matrimonial agreement made or modified
during marriage? A legislature truly concerned with the protection
of the less-worldly spouse would be expected to address the subtle
means of overreaching as well as such obvious means as matrimonial
agreements. Consistent protection against interspousal overreaching
whether by subtle or obvious means could have been achieved had
the legislature provided that, in contracting with each other,
spouses or prospective spouses stand in a confidential or fiduciary
relationship. The high standard of disclosure and responsibility that
this relationship entails would give a court sufficient authority to in-
validate harsh contracts between spouses.
The uncertainty of the fate of the provision requiring judicial ap-
proval prior to and during the session resulted in legislative inatten-
tion to the mechanics for securing judicial approval of a matrimonial
agreement. There is no appropriate venue for the action under the
Code of Civil Procedure. The special venue rules for annulment of
marriage, separation from bed and board, or divorce78 or for parti-
tion of the community property" do not apply, nor does the general
venue article, which contemplates only adversary proceedings, 5 apply
69. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2348, comment (b) (Supp. 1979).
70. Article 2398 of the Civil Code of 1870 had prohibited the wife from binding
herself for her husband's debts. This prohibition was explicitly removed by Act 89 of
1974 and had been implicitly removed earlier by passage of the Married Women's
Emancipation Acts (now appearing as LA. R.S. 9:1031-05 (1950). See LA. R.S. 9:103
(1950).
71. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1532 & 1746. Commentators are of the opinion that dona-
tions between spouses during marriage may encompass future as well as present prop-
erty. C. LAZARUS, SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS, CASES AND READING MATERIALS 504
(1975); 3 M. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 1, no. 3208, at 561 (11th ed. La. L. Inst.
trans. 1959).
72. 1979 La. Acts, No. 711, amending LA. CIv. CODE art. 1790. However, contrac-
ting for a future succession may only be done by the spouses in an antenuptial agree-
ment. 1979 La. Acts, No. 711, amending LA. CIV. CODE art. 1888.
73. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3941.
74. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 82.
75. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 42.
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to an action upon joint petition."6 Since the action is not subject to
any mandatory venue requirement," the spouses may apparently
confer venue by consent and shop, if they wish, for a parish where
the judges are noted for their willingness to approve matrimonial
agreements. Spouses should not assume that a joint petition, stating
their intended change, and a judgment approving it contain suffi-
cient formalities for a valid matrimonial agreement. Although Act
627 had explicitly stated that matrimonial agreements made or
changed during marriage must conform to the same formalities as
those made prior to marriage,6 this rule is implicit in article 2331 of
Act 709. Thus, judicial proceedings were not intended as alternate
formalities for making or changing matrimonial agreements during
marriage, but rather as additional formalities with which the
spouses must comply. This conclusion is consistent with the
legislature's desire to make it more difficult to change matrimonial
regimes during marriage. Consequently, the joint petition should be
accompanied by an agreement executed according to the formalities
prescribed by article 2331. The judge must somehow identify the
agreement as the one that he approved. A procedure might be
followed similar to that for probate of testaments, wherein the
judge would paraph the agreement ne varietur over his signature7"
and sign a judgment similar to the proces verbal" of the probate of
a testament, reciting what was done at the hearing for judicial ap-
proval. Both agreement and judgment should then be recorded as
required by law. 1
Article 2329 makes judicial approval depend upon whether the
spouses understand the principles and rules governing the
matrimonial regime and whether such a regime serves their best in-
terests. Judges can scarcely ascertain whether the spouses have
achieved a meaningful depth of understanding of their regime short
of administering an exam to them on the subject. Testimony as to
understanding is likely to be produced by means of leading ques-
tions or else by prepared paraphrases of the rules and principles of
the desired regime. Since the spouses have no adversary, there will
be no cross-examination unless the judge becomes an inquisitor, an
unfamiliar role for Louisiana judges.2 It would seem that the judge
76, LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329 (Supp. 1979).
77. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 44.
78. LA. R.S. 9:2834 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979).
79. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2882.
80. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2890.
81. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2266; LA. CIV. CODE art. 2332 (Supp. 1979).
82. Proponents of judicial approval often cited French Code civil article 1397,
which requires judicial approval for a contractual change in a matrimonial regime dur-
ing marriage, as authority for the wisdom of a similar requirement in Louisiana.
However, the French legal system may be better suited for this kind of judicial inquiry
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could more usefully inquire into whether a spouse's consent was
both freely given and informed. Although a spouse may not under-
stand all of the ramifications of a change in regime, the spouse may
have received advice from independent counsel or trusted family
members and on their recommendation may be perfectly willing to
make the change. So long as the judge is satisfied that the spouse
who lacks thorough understanding of the agreement has not been
imposed upon by the other spouse, he should approve the agree-
ment. As extra insurance against imposition, the judge could ex-
amine each spouse outside the presence of the other spouse and the
lawyers, reminiscent of a procedure followed at one time under the
Civil Code when a married woman wished to contract a debt for her
separate benefit. 3
The judge must also make a finding that the agreement "serves
their [the spouses'] best interests."'" Are monetary interests the only
interests to be considered or may emotional and psychological in-
terests also be weighed? Whatever may be the nature of the in-
terest involved, must it be shared equally by both spouses, as the
word "their" might imply, or may the interest of one spouse
predominate? For example, suppose husband and wife were married
after January 1, 1980, under the legal regime. Their income has
been provided by the husband's separate property and the wife's
salary. Under the legal regime, the husband may by unilateral
declaration, classify the income from his separate property as
separate property. 5 Then, not only would any accumulation of this
income be the husband's separate property, but if this income is
spent on the ordinary and customary expenses of the marriage,
than Louisiana's. In the first place, French judges are professionally trained as judges
and familiar with the role of questioner. See P. HERZOG. CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE §§
3.11 to .21 & 7.51(c) (1967). Additionally, a member of the ministry of justice attends a
proceeding to homologate a change in a matrimonial regime and is heard on how the
proposed change affects the public interest. Patarin, Contrat de Mariage: Modifica-
tions postdrieures d la cd~lbration du mariage, JURIS CLASSEUR-CIVIL arts. 1396-97 no'
44-55 (1978). On the appropriateness of French procedural devices for Louisiana see
generally Comment, Litigation Preclusion in Louisiana: Welch v. Crown Zellerbach
Corporation and the Death of Collateral Estoppel, 53 TUL. L. REV. 875, 901 (1979).
83. Between 1855 and 1916, a married woman with her husband's consent and
with the approval of a judge could borrow money, or contract debts for her separate
benefit, and grant mortgages on her separate property to secure the debts. LA. CIV.
CODE arts. 126-28. These articles were explicitly repealed in 1974 by the legislature.
1974 La. Acts, No. 89, § 2. Nonetheless, they had been implicitly repealed earlier,
when the legislature passed the first Married Women's Emancipation Acts. (now ap-
pearing as LA. R.S. 9:101-05 (1950)). The Code had specifically provided that the wife
must be examined "separate and apart" from her husband as to whether the debt was
solely for her advantage. LA. CIV. CODE art. 127 (repealed 1974).
84. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329 (Supp. 1979).
85. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2339 (Supp. 1979).
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there may arise a claim for reimbursement against the wife. 8 The
wife wishes to have assurance that the income from the husband's
separate property will remain community property not subject to
the husband's ability to make the income separate property by
unilateral act. He agrees that she should have this assurance
because he feels that she, having been a good wife, deserves it. If
they seek judicial approval of a contract that permanently classifies
the husband's income from separate property as community property,
the judge should not deny approval because the resulting regime
will not be symmetrical or because the change is not in the
monetary interest of the husband. One of the best reasons for chang-
ing a matrimonial regime during marriage is to remedy the un-
fairness to one spouse of the previous regime. Such commendable
motives should not be thwarted by interpreting "their best in-
terests" to allow approval of only those contracts that are sym-
metrical or that redound to the financial advantage of both spouses.
Generosity between spouses has always been encouraged by the
Code. The Code permitted spouses to donate to each other" even
when it barred them from otherwise contracting with each other,8
and some of its restrictive rules of donations inter vivos did not ap-
ply to donations between spouses.88 Consequently, the judge should
not reject an agreement solely because it is financially lopsided, if
he is otherwise satisfied that the spouse who is making the financial
sacrifice or taking the risk is doing so of his own free will in the
spirit of helping his spouse.
What if the agreement on its face provides equal opportunity for
each spouse to gain or lose, but, because of the actual earning situa-
tion of the spouses, the effect of the agreement will be to favor one
spouse? Suppose the husband, who has adult children by a previous
marriage, marries again under the legal regime. The second wife,
wishing to promote harmony with his children, agrees to change to a
separate property regime to demonstrate that she has no designs on
his fortune. On its face, the separate property regime treats the
spouses equally, but as applied to the wife in this example, it may
cause her to suffer financially if her earnings and income are not
equal to her husband's. If she understands how the regime will work
as applied to her, and if her consent was freely given, the judge
should permit the wife to be generous, since this agreement, by pro-
moting family harmony, will serve the spouses' best interests.
A second marriage may also present a situation in which the
86. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2365 (Supp. 1979).
87. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1746.
88. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1790 (as it appeared prior to 1979 La. Acts, No. 711).
89. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1532.
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proposed change is to the financial disadvantage of children of a
previous marriage. For example, a husband, having children by a
previous marriage, may agree to the conversion of some of his
separate property to community or to the disproportionate enlarge-
ment of the wife's share of the community. May the judge consider
the interest of the children in approving the agreement? In France,
the Code civil makes the court's approval of a change dependent on
the interest of the family," and courts have struggled to reconcile
the interest of a spouse with that of the children. Some decisions
have simply placed the interest of a spouse ahead of the interest of
a child in the absence of fraud; 1 other decisions have said that
assuring a spouse's financial welfare is in the interest of the family
as a whole. 2 In contrast to the Code civi4 Louisiana's new article
2329 makes court approval dependent on the best interest of the
spouses;"' consequently, the Louisiana judge need not be concerned
with the adverse financial effect that the proposed agreement could
have on the children of one of the spouses. After all, the children
are protected elsewhere in the law. As forced heirs, they will always
have a right to reduce excessive donations," even when the dona-
tions occur between spouses. Thus, any donations contained in the
matrimonial agreement are subject to reduction. Lest there be any
doubt that the right to reduce excessive donations reaches benefits
conferred by matrimonial agreement, the first paragraph of Loui-
siana Civil Code article 1754 states that spouses "cannot give to
each other, indirectly, beyond what is permitted by the foregoing
dispositions."" The meaning of "indirect" gifts in the first paragraph
of article 1754 is not, however, self-evident. The term does not mean
"disguised donations" or donations through an interposed party,
since the second paragraph of article 1754 deals with them
specificallyY Article 1754 is taken verbatim from the Code
Napoleon, 9 which also contained some specific rules, not found in
the Louisiana Civil Code, on reduction by children of a previous mar-
riage of benefits conferred by matrimonial agreement." It is to
90. C. Civ. art. 1397.
91. See 2 SOIXANTE-DIX-CINQUIPME CONGRPS DES NOTAIRES DE FRANCE, LE STATUT
MATRIMONIAL DU FRAN(CAIS 831 (1978).
92. Judgment of 6 jan. 1976, Cass. civ., J.C.P. 1976.2.18461.
93. The word "their" modifying "best interests" in article 2329 refers to
"spouses."
94. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1502.
95. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1746 & 1752.
96. (Emphasis added.)
97. The second paragraph provides: "All donations disguised, or made to persons
interposed, shall be null and void." LA. CIV. CODE art. 1754.
98. Code Napoleon art. 1099 (1804).
99. Code Napoleon arts. 1496 & 1627 (1804). See C. LAZARUS. supra note 71, at
505-06 (discussion of Louisiana Civil Code article 1754).
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these benefits that the "indirect" gifts refer in the Code Napoleon
and in Louisiana Civil Code article 1754, thus making the benefits
subject to reduction.0 0 This is so despite the argument that they
ought not be considered gratuities because the spouses should be
deemed to have received value from each other in ways not solely
financial."' Unfortunately, Louisiana has no rules corresponding to
the Code civil's special rules for reduction of indirect gifts to second
or subsequent spouses made via matrimonial agreements. When
such a situation arises, French law could profitably be consulted to
define the scope of reduction for these indirect gifts.02
Since the judicial inquiry must focus on the best interests of the
spouses, they should not have to prove that no harm will accrue to
their creditors as a result of the proposed agreement. Creditors, like
forced heirs, are protected in other areas of the law. Available to
the creditors are the same remedies they have against any contract
of the debtor, in particular, the revocatory action,"' the action in
declaration of simulation, 4 and the oblique action.0 5 Thus, for exam-
ple, if a husband transferred property gratuitously to his wife by
means of a matrimonial agreement, and in so doing, rendered
himself insolvent or increased his insolvency, a creditor whose debt
had accrued prior to the matrimonial agreement could invoke the
revocatory action and avoid the transfer upon showing that the
transfer was in actual or constructive fraud of his rights.'" Likewise,
if the matrimonial regime contract purported to transfer property
from the debtor, but the spouses actually intended no transfer, the
creditor could set aside the simulated transaction. 7 In this cir-
cumstance, the creditor need not prove that he has been prejudiced
or defrauded.1  Finally, if, in a matrimonial agreement, the debtor-
spouse renounced a right to property or released a debt without
.payment, a prejudiced creditor could exercise the rights of his deb-
100. The penalty of nullity under the second paragraph of article 1754 does not ap-
ply to the indirect gifts mentioned in the first paragraph which, as at French law, are
like direct gifts, merely reducible. C. LAZARUS, supra note 71, at 505-06.
101. • M. PLANIOL, supra note 71, at nos. 1396-415.
102. For example, Code civil article 1527 states that only benefits resulting from
contributions in capital, and not benefits based on income, are subject to reduction. Id.
at nos. 1405-06.
103. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 1968-94. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 2376, comment (Supp. 1979).
104. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2239.
105. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1989-92.
106. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1968-94. See generally Note, Dation en Paiement: Pro-
blems with the Elusive Concept of Prejudice when Bringing the Revocatory Action,
40 LA. L. REV. - (1979).
107. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2239.
108. See Litvinoff, The Action in Declaration of Simulation in Louisiana Law, in
ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 139 (J. Dainow ed. 1969).
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tor as if the debtor had not renounced or released the rights, unless
those rights were personal to the debtor.' 9 It should be noted,
however, that not every act or contract of the debtor which
diminishes his estate prejudices the creditor. An unsecured creditor
always takes the risk that his debtor will deplete his assets or incur
more debts. Since, by not taking security, the unsecured creditor
voluntarily settles for uncertainty in the repayment of the debt, he
should not be able to upset his debtor's contract with great frequency
or ease.
In light of the remedies which the law presently makes available
to creditors against the contracts of their debtors, should a creditor
also be allowed to intervene in the proceeding in which the spouses
seek judicial approval of their matrimonial agreement? French law
specifically allows creditors to intervene in the proceeding to ap-
prove the matrimonial agreement if there has been a fraud on their
rights,"' but Louisiana's article 2329 is silent on the subject. Under
old Civil Code article 2435, creditors were given the right to in-
tervene in a suit between the spouses for separation of property, or
even to annul the judgment. A right to intervene or annul the judg-
ment was necessary to protect the creditors in the case of a judicial
separation of property, since the new regime would have resulted
from a law suit, not a contract, and hence the normal remedies
against debtor's contracts would be inapplicable. Act 709 as originally
introduced,"' and even the version passed by the House,"' continued
the creditors' right to intervene or annul a judgment in a judicial
separation of property, but said nothing with respect to a creditor's
right to intervene in a proceeding for judicial approval of a contrac-
tual change in regime. This was logical, since creditors already have
adequate remedies against their debtor's contracts. Nevertheless, a
Senate amendment to article 2376 of Act 709, in which the House
concurred, may have made intervention by creditors possible in a
proceeding in which judicial approval of a contractual change in
regime is sought. Article 2376 is preceded by two articles describing
the action of a spouse living under a community regime to force a
judicial separation of property. Following these two articles, article
2376 provides: "The creditors of a spouse, by intervention in the
proceeding, may object to the separation of property or modification
of their matrimonial regime as being in fraud of their rights.""' The
evidence is clear and convincing that the italicized words, added by
109. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1989-92.
110. C. civ. art. 1397.
111. La. H.B. No. 798 (original version), proposed LA. CIV. CODE art. 2376, 5th Reg.
Sess. (1979).
112. La. H.B. No. 798 (reengrossed version), proposed LA. CIV. CODE art. 2376, 5th
Reg. Sess. (1979).
113. (Emphasis added.)
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the Senate, were injected in haste. Not only is the pronoun "their,"
which modifies "matrimonial regime," and "rights" ambiguous as to
whether it refers to creditors or spouses, but also it is unclear
whether "the proceeding" for which intervention is authorized
refers to the proceeding for judicial separation of property, to which
the preceding article is addressed, or the proceeding for judicial ap-
proval of a contractual modification of the regime. The added
language could certainly be read as authorizing intervention by
creditors in both kinds of proceedings. Nothing in the general article
on intervention in the Code of Civil Procedure1 1 4 supports a nar-
rower interpretation. It thus appears that the legislature has given
the creditors an opportunity to interfere in the spouses' matrimonial
agreement when judicial approval is necessary even though their
rights are adequately protected elsewhere in the law. Presumably
intervening creditors would have to show the same facts that would
entitle the creditors to the normal remedies against contracts before
the judge can disapprove the proposed matrimonial agreement.
The effect of judicial approval of a matrimonial agreement under
article 2329 of Act 709 is also unclear. Does judicial approval simply
remove an incapacity that spouses have during marriage to make
this particular kind of contract, leaving other issues affecting validity
of the agreement undecided, or does the judge's approval preclude a
spouse from ever disputing the validity of the matrimonial agree-
ment? Resort to traditional issue preclusion analysis has been
restricted recently by the Louisiana Supreme Court's rejection of
the common law issue preclusion doctrine of collateral estoppel. The
court has held that Louisiana's only device to prevent relitigation of
issues is res judicata, which requires identity of the parties, the
cause, and the thing demanded.11 Under this narrow view of issue
preclusion, a spouse would not be precluded from bringing an action
to annul the contract for error,"' duress,"7 or fraud,"8 since the
"cause" and the "thing demanded" would differ from that of the ac-
tion for judicial approval. Even if common law collateral estoppel
were available in Louisiana, it is doubtful whether it should apply to
a non-adversary proceeding in which no conflicting evidence is pro-
duced"' and which can be viewed as simply adding further solemnity
to the occasion. If applicable, common law collateral estoppel would
114. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1091.
115. Welch v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 359 So. 2d 154, 156 (La. 1978). See Note,
The End of Collateral Estoppel in Louisiana.: Welch v. Crown Zellerbach Corporation,
40 LA. L. REV. 246 (1979).
116. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1820-46.
117. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1850-59.
118. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1847-49. If the contract amounted to a partition, a spouse
may also seek to annul the contract for lesion. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1861.
119. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 566 (2d ed. 1977).
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not extend beyond the issue actually decided.' 0 Exactly what issue
was decided by the judicial approval of the matrimonial agreement
is difficult to determine. Arguably, the issue resolved may be any
one of the following: the agreement was in the best interest of the
spouses and they understood the rules and principles of the regime,
or the spouses were not incapacitated from making the agreement,
or the spouses' consent as well as their capacity to contract was
perfect. Perhaps, in light of the problems of applying common law
collateral estoppel to this situation, it is just as well that the
supreme court has excluded the application of the doctrine. Of
course, even though the judgment has no issue precluding effect in
an action to avoid the agreement, any of the testimony in the pro-
ceeding for judicial authorization can be used as an evidentiary ad-
mission in the later action. Unless an admission is "explained away,"
it may be in effect as conclusive against a party as collateral estop-
pel.
Article 2329 creates a Civil Code anomaly; it is the only instance
in which persons generally capable of contracting, having consented
with respect to a certain object and lawful purpose' and complied
with prescribed formalities of execution, still would not have made a
valid contract. Thus, it is not surprising that the Code provides no
analogies for determining the effect of judicial approval of the
matrimonial agreement. The nearest analogy to the proceeding for
judicial approval is the obsolete procedure under repealed articles
127 and 128, whereby a married woman who obtained the authoriza-
tion of her husband and a judge could contract debts for her own
separate benefit and secure them by a mortgage on her separate
property. Under this procedure, she had to satisfy the judge, outside
the presence of her husband, that the debt was contracted solely for
her advantage and not for the advantage of her husband. Once
satisfied as to the personal advantage to the wife, the judge issued a
certificate to that effect, which when annexed to an act of mortgage
"furnished full proof against her and heirs .. . ."'I' At the time this
procedure was in use, a contract with a married woman obligating
her separate property was not valid if made for the, benefit of her
husband.' Consequently, the judicial certificate was held to relieve
a creditor who sought to enforce a mortgage executed by a married
woman of the burden of proving a fundamental element of validity:
that the funds were actually used for the wife's separate benefit.'
120. Id. at 564 n.3.
121. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 1779.
122. LA. CIV. CODE art. 128 (repealed 1974). See note 83, supr.
123. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2398 (repealed 1974). See note 70, supra.
124. Marchand v. Griffon, 140 U.S. 516 (1891); Fortier v. New Orleans Bank, 112
U.S. 439 (1884); National City Bank of Chicago v. Barringer, 143 La. 14, 78 So. 134
(1918).
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The judicial certificate did not prevent the wife from proving fraud
or complicity between the creditor and the husband to use the funds
for the husband's benefit, 2 ' but it did preclude the wife from raising
against a party in good faith the issue of how the funds were used.
By analogy to this procedure, it would seem that a spouse would not
be precluded by judicial approval of a matrimonial agreement from
showing the bad faith of the other spouse either in inducing a vice
of consent or in having knowledge that the facts were other than
those established before the judge. The good faith contracting
spouse would be protected on the issues that the judge "certifies"
(i.e., that the agreement was understood and was in the spouses'
best interest). But, since article 128 expressly stated the effect of
judicial certification to be full proof against the wife and her heirs,
whereas article 2329 says nothing with respect to the effect of
judicial approval, reliance on analogies to the jurisprudence that
developed under articles 127 and 128 would be somewhat dangerous.
And, since no collateral estoppel effect can be given to judicial ap-
proval, it would seem that judicial approval amounts to little more
than an extra formality, adding solemnity to the making or changing
of a matrimonial regime during marriage.
Both Act 627 and Act 709 contain articles forbidding provisions
of a matrimonial agreement which stipulate the renunciation or
alteration of the marital portion and the alteration of the established
order of succession." 6 Nor may spouses derogate by their conven-
tions from laws made for the public order and good morals.'27
Beyond these substantive limitations, Act 627 left the spouses free
to devise by matrimonial agreement whatever system of ownership
and management of marital property they wished, and once the
agreement was properly recorded, the chosen system was effective
against third persons."' At this point, Act 709 diverges significantly
from Act 627 by providing an additional substantive limitation on
matrimonial agreements. Article 2330 of Act 709 provides: "Nor may
the spouses limit with respect to third persons the right that one
spouse alone has under the legal regime to obligate the community
or to alienate, encumber, or lease community property." This pro-
hibition is applicable only as to third persons; between the spouses,
125. Id.
126. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2330 (Supp. 1979); LA. R.S. 9:2833 (Supp. 1978) (repealed
1979). Act 627 additionally forbade prohibitions on gratuitous dispositions. LA. R.S.
9:2833 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979). See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2325-27 (repealed 1979).
127. LA. Civ. CODE art. 11. For example, in Holliday v. Holliday, 358 So. 2d 618 (La.
1978), the court invalidated, as against public policy, a provision in an antenuptial
agreement waiving alimony pendente lite. See Note, Louisiana's Forbidden Antenup-
tial Waiver of Alimony Pendente Lite, 39 LA. L. REV. 1161 (1979).
128. LA. R.S. 9:2834 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979).
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there are no limitations upon the management scheme they may
devise. The purpose of the prohibition is to assure a third person
dealing with one spouse alone that that spouse has at least all of the
powers the legal regime gives to a spouse acting alone." Thus,
when a spouse seeks unsecured credit, the creditor can rely on the
power given the spouse under the legal regime by article 2345 to
obligate the community property for debts; the creditor need not
concern himself with whether that spouse is disabled by his
matrimonial agreement from obligating the community property
without the other spouse's consent. Article 2330 does not prohibit
the matrimonial agreement from giving a spouse more power to act
alone than the legal regime would give him. Thus, a matrimonial
agreement may give the husband the sole power to alienate or en-
cumber community immovable property, even though such action
under the legal regime would have required the wife's consent.30
Since this provision would be effective against third parties, as well
as between the spouses, it follows that a third party could not
refuse title from the husband alone.
Article 2330 thus prohibits, insofar as the effect on third parties
is concerned, the spouses from contractually establishing any com-
munity regime that distributes management authority in such a way
as to give one of the spouses less authority to act alone than would
be given by the legal regime. It prohibits total management of the
community by a designated spouse. For example, it precludes con-
tractual adoption of a "head and master" management system, for
the wife cannot, so far as third parties are concerned, be deprived of
her right to obligate the community property. While head and
master is unsatisfactory as a legal regime, there should be no objec-
tion to it as a contractual regime. In fact, management by one
spouse exclusively might be desirable if the other spouse is ill or
mentally unstable. Sole management by one spouse might, in certain
circumstances, obviate the need for interdiction of the other spouse.
Article 2330 also precludes spouses from contractually establishing
as to third persons a "two funds" management system whereby each
spouse manages and obligates the community property he would
129. The instances under the legal regime of Act 709 when one spouse may act
alone with respect to community property are: (1) Those for which a spouse has equal
management authority. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2345 (Supp. 1979) (obligating community prop-
erty for debts); LA. CIv. CODE art. 2346 (Supp. 1979) (general equal management rule
for untitled movables). (2) Those for which a spouse has exclusive management authori-
ty. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2350 (Supp. 1979) (movable assets of community business manag-
ed solely by one spouse); LA. CIv. CODE art. 2351 (Supp. 1979) (movables issued or
registered in one spouse's name); LA. CIv. CODE art. 2352 (Supp. 1979) (partnership in-
terest of partner-spouse).
130. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2347 (Supp. 1979).
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have owned and managed if single.131 The two funds system, while
unsatisfactory as a legal regime, could prove useful to spouses who
each pursue a separate profession and are approximately equal in
wealth.
A case might be made for prohibiting such useful contractual
management arrangements if the prohibition accomplished its pur-
pose of relieving the third party of the necessity to inquire as to
whether a married person has made a matrimonial agreement. But,
since article 2330 allows total freedom to arrange the ownership in-
terests in marital property,132 it would seem that the third party
must still inquire as to whether there is a matrimonial agreement in
order to determine what the spouse owns. There is little security
for a third party in knowing that the spouse with whom he is deal-
ing has the power to obligate the community property, if by
matrimonial agreement there is no community. Spouses who are
determined that each of them should have sole control over certain
property that would under the legal regime be subject to equal
management or the power of the other spouse to obligate are driven
by article 2330 either to contract for a regime of separation of prop-
erty, which can be disastrous for the economically inferior spouse,
or to contract for a deferred community regime, similar to the legal
regime in Quebece3M and a contractual regime in France,"' but largely
unknown in Louisiana. Thus, the prohibition of article 2330 has little
merit; it offers no definitive protection to third parties and prohibits
the spouses from usefully tailor-making their management system
except indirectly by drastic deviations from the legal regime in the
ownership of their marital property.
Like Act 62718 and prior law,' Act 709 prescribes rules for a
separation of property regime. 137 Article 2372 of Act 709 contains a
significant departure from Act 627 and prior law. It states: "A
spouse is solidarily liable with the other spouse who incurs an
obligation for necessaries for himself or the family." Comment (a) to
article 2372 notes that this rule of solidarity for necessaries applies
as to third parties; between the spouses, the debt is apportioned ac-
cording to their contract or in proportion to each spouse's means.
131. This is similar to the management scheme for the legal regime recommended
by the Louisiana State Law Institute in 1P77. See La. H.B. No. 783, 3d Reg. Sess.
(1977).
132. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2330, comment (d) (Supp. 1979).
133. CODE Civ. arts. 1266(c) to 1267(d) (Que.) (socidtd d'acqu~ts or "partnership of
acquets").
134. C. civ. arts. 1569-81 (regimd de participation aux acquits).
135. LA. R.S. 9:2855 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979).
136. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2392-96 (repealed 1979).
137. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2370-74 (Supp. 1979).
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The Louisiana State Law Institute, the originator of the solidarity
rule, intended for the rule to be a matter of public order for all
separation of property regimes.'38 The reference in the Act to
French Code civil article 220 as a source for article 2372 is consis-
tent with this intent, since Code civil article 220 makes solidary
liability for necessaries a matter of public order."9 The purpose of
solidary liability is to allow the economically inferior spouse to
bargain with third parties for necessaries on the strength of the
combined property of the spouses. It is the counterpart of article
2345 of the legal regime whereby each spouse can obligate the com-
munity property. However, under the legal regime, a debt made by
one spouse does not obligate the other spouse personally without his
consent; only the separate property of the debtor spouse and the
property classified as community is obligated. By contrast, article
2372 allows a spouse to obligate the other spouse personally for
necessaries, thus rendering his entire property - not just the property
that would have been classified community under the legal
regime-liable for the debt. Article 2372 imposes on the spouses the
very thing they may have wished to avoid by adopting a regime of
separation of property: the ability of one spouse to obligate the earn-
ings and savings of the other without his consent.4 Because solidary
liability has that effect, the French have carefully circumscribed the
spouses' authority to obligate each other. The French Code civil ar-
ticle 220 expressly does not impose solidary liability for expenses
which are manifestly excessive, nor for credit purchases made
without the consent of the other spouse."' Commentators interpret
article 220 as excluding for purposes of solidary liability exceptional
expenses, such as the purchase of an automobile or an apartment,
and including only such ordinary expenses as those for nourishment,
clothing, medicine, education, furniture, and renting of lodging.'
They even doubt whether a loan to a spouse for ordinary expenses
creates solidarity unless the purpose of the loan was known to the
lender and he proves that the funds were actually used for that pur-
pose.' 4 Louisiana's article 2372 contains no limitations other than
138. RECOMMENDATION, supra note 42, Expos6 des Motifs, provides: "[Tihe only
substantial change in the law governing separation of property relates to the solidary
obligation of the spouses for necessaries. This obligation is a matter of public policy
and should be part of all regimes of separation of property."
139. 1 J. PATARIN ET G. MORIN, LA RPFORME DES RftGIMES MATRIMONIAUX no 7 (4th ed.
1977).
140. Earnings and the savings therefrom would be classified as community prop-
erty under the legal regime and would be subject to the power of either spouse to
obligate. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2338 & 2345 (Supp. 1979).
141. C. civ. art. 220.
142. J. PATARIN ET G. MORIN, supra note 139, at § 23.
143. Id.
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those that can be derived from the interpretation of the word
"necessaries." The jurisprudence that developed under Louisiana
Civil Code articles 120 and 1786, whereby the wife could obligate
the husband for necessaries he failed to provide, could be consulted
for the term's perimeters." The new rule of solidarity for
necessaries would be applicable not only in cases of contractual
separation of property, but also in cases where a separate property
regime results from a judgment.145 Thus, after a judgment of separa-
tion from bed and board terminates the community and creates a
separate property regime, attorneys' fees in the subsequent divorce
action, if considered necessities, might be the solidary responsibility
of both spouses.
The differences between the two acts concerning registry of
matrimonial agreements are minor. Article 2332 of Act 709 requires
registry in the conveyance records rather than the mortgage
records as had section 2834 of Act 627. Both acts require registry in
the parish of the situs of immovable property, in order to affect
third parties as to the immovable property, and in the parish of the
spouses' domicile, in order to affect third parties as to movable prop-
erty.14 Unfortunately, Act 709 left unsolved a problem that had been
noticed after passage of Act 627. If a spouse is domiciled in Parish
A, but transacts business concerning movables in distant Parish B, a
third party in Parish B will be inconvenienced unduly by having to
check the conveyance office in Parish A to verify the spouse's latest
matrimonial agreement. Act 709 also did not remedy the problem of
spouses domiciled out of state who need to establish ownership of
movables located in Louisiana under Louisiana's matrimonial
regimes law. To solve both of these problems and for convenience
generally, the Louisiana State Law Institute had recommended a
system of central registry of matrimonial agreements in the Loui-
siana Secretary of State's office,1"' but central registry did not sur-
144. See, e.g., D.H. Holmes Co. v. Morris, 177 So. 417 (La. 1937) (jewelry not
necessary); Watson v. Veuleman, 260 So. 2d 123 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972) (automobile for
son not necessary); Goldring's, Inc. v. Seeling, 139 So. 2d 538 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962)
(duplicate clothing can be necessary according to financial and social condition of
spouses).
145. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2370 (Supp. 1979). Although this article refers to a "judg-
ment decreeing separation of property," a separate property regime should also result
from a judgment of separation from bed and board that terminates the community
regime. LA. CIV. CODE art. 155.
146. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2332 (Supp. 1979); LA. R.S. 9:2834 (Supp. 1978) (repealed
1979).
147. La. H.B. No. 802, 5th Reg. Sess. (1979); La. H.B. No. 798 (original version), pro-
posed LA. Civ. CODE art. 2332, 5th Reg. Sess. (1979). Declarations made by a spouse
pursuant to article 2339, making the natural and civil fruits of separate property
separate, were similarly to be filed in the central registry under the Law Institute
recommendation. La. H.B. No. 798 (original version), proposed LA. CIv. CODE, art. 2339,
5th Reg. Sess. (1979).
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vive review by the House Civil Law and Procedure Committee.'
That committee apparently thought that checking the central
registry would be an unnecessary inconvenience for a third party,
particularly a title examiner, whose only dealings are with local people
or local property. For him, it is more convenient to check only the
local parish records. The Committee overlooked the fact that the
central registry scheme did not do away with the requirement of
recording a matrimonial agreement in the parish where immovable
property is located in order to affect third parties as to that prop-
erty.' 4 Thus, with respect to all local transactions in immovables, a
copy of the locally recorded matrimonial agreement would either
have been found or else the matrimonial agreement would have
been ineffective. Title examinations would not have been made more
cumbersome by central registry, which could have solved the prob-
lem of the inter-parish transactions in movables and of the spouses
not domiciled in Louisiana.
Transitional Provisions
The transitional provisions of Act 709 bear practically no
resemblance to those of Act 627 except that both manifest an intent
to subject as many people as possible to the new legal regime. Act
627, however, did leave spouses free to reject or modify the new
legal regime by matrimonial agreement;'5 thus, they could, if they
wished, keep the old legal regime by making it their contractual
regime. Article 2330 of Act 709, however, prohibits as to third per-
sons any contractual limitation in community regimes of the right
that a spouse has under the legal regime to act alone."' Thus, this
article prohibits the spouses, insofar as third parties are concerned,
from choosing a one-spouse management system. This prohibition
would be applicable to couples married after January 1, 1980, the ef-
fective date of Act 709,52 and, if applicable to persons married under
the legal regime prior to that date, would preclude their continuing
to live by contract under the management rules of the old regime.
The Law Institute recommendation contained a provision allowing
148. La. H.B. No. 798 (engrossed version), 5th Reg. Sess. (1979). On recommenda-
tion of the Committee, the House approved deletion of article 2332, thus removing the
central registry scheme, without replacing it with any registry requirement. See La.
H.B. No. 798 (reengrossed version), 5th Reg. Sess. (1979). The Senate inserted article
2332 in its present form. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2332 (Supp. 1979).
149. La. H.B. No. 798 (original version), proposed LA. CIv. CODE art. 2332, comment
(b), 5th Reg. Sess. (1979).
150. LA. R.S. 9:2833 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979); 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 9
(repealed 1979).
151. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2330 (Supp. 1979). See text at notes 128-32, supra.
152. 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 13.
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spouses married ,under the old legal regime to elect, by a
matrimonial agreement executed prior to January 1, 1980, to con-
tinue living under it' and to incorporate by reference the entirety
of the existing law of the old legal regime.' The Joint Subcommit-
tee saw no reason to give a special privilege to those married under
the legal regime prior to January 1, 1980 to maintain the old legal
regime by contract, since those married after that date could not so
elect. The bill, as originally introduced with the Joint
Subcommittee's amendment, provided that spouses living under the
existing legal community regime could, prior to January 1, 1980,
adopt by contract a matrimonial regime of their choice "subject to
the provisions of this act."'55 The words "subject to the provisions of
this act" were understood to refer to, among other things, the pro-
hibition of article 2330. The version passed by the House deleted the
words "subject to the provisions of this act."'5 6 With this deletion,
the House went beyond the Law Institute's recommendation, by giv-
ing spouses married under the old legal regime not only the contrac-
tual ability to keep the old regime, but also the ability to make any
other contractual regime that might not conform to the prohibition
of article 2330. Under the version passed by the House, spouses
married prior to January 1, 1980 could thus contractually enter into
a "two funds" system of management, while those married after
January 1, 1980, could not. This inequity was remedied by a Senate
insertion in the final version of the bill, which provided that spouses
living under the existing legal community regime could, prior to
January 1, 1980, adopt by contract a matrimonial regime of their
choice "in accordance with the provisions of this Act, except that
such agreements shall not be subject to the requirement of court ap-
proval as provided by Article 2329 of this Act."'' Thus, the only
privilege given to those married under the legal regime prior to
1980 is relief from the necessity of seeking court approval of
matrimonial agreements. Those matrimonial agreements entered in-
to prior to January 1, 1980, as well as any executed after January 1,
1980, are subject to the prohibition of article 2330.
The situation involving spouses presently living under a regime
of conventional community established by antenuptial agreement is
more complicated. Section 12 of Act 709 states that such spouses
"shall be subject to the provisions of this Act governing conven-
tional community property regimes as to matters not provided for in
153. RECOMMENDATION, supra note 42, proposed § 11.
154. Id., proposed § 14.
155. La. H.B. No. 798 (original version), proposed § 10, 5th Reg. Sess. (1979).
156. La. H.B. No. 798 (reengrossed version), proposed § 10, 5th Reg. Sess. (1979).
157. 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 10.
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the matrimonial agreement." The "provisions of this Act" referred
to must be articles 2325-2333 that deal which matrimonial regime
agreements generally. These articles include the rule that all of the
provisions of the new legal regime that have not been excluded or
modified by the agreement apply, " as well as the prohibition of arti-
cle 2330 against limiting a spouse's power to act alone with respect
to the community property. Spouses who had made their antenuptial
contract against the background of the old legal regime are unlikely
to have used terms precisely modifying or excluding the rules of a
new legal regime which they did not anticipate. Nor are they likely
to have expressly stipulated for parts of the old legal regime that
they desired to maintain, since these provisions of the old legal
regime would have been applicable, not having been excluded or
modified. Will a mere contractual reference to the old legal regime
suffice to override the provisions of Act 709 concerning, for exam-
ple, management? If not, spouses with contractual communities may
be surprised to find themselves equal managers. If the spouses' in-
tent was that the husband should be "head and master," it is simply
too bad. Act 709 does not allow them to restate their intent contrac-
tually prior to January 1, 1980, and after that date any contract
they make will be subject to article 2330's prohibition on limiting
equal management.
Spouses presently separate in property, whether by contract or
by judgment, are subject to the provisions of Act 709 governing
separation of property." Thus, they are subject to solidary liability
to third persons for necessaries, with no exception for spouses who
may have made a contract that provided otherwise. These spouses,
in addition to the spouses who have a contractual community and
who intended, but did not provide, for husband-management, may
argue that their contracts are being unconstitutionally impaired by
the new law.
The transitional provisions of Act 709, in contrast to those of
Act 627,"' make no attempt to specify whether the new law is ap-
plicable to particular transactions, assets, or liabilities. When a
retroactivity question arises, the court will first have to wrestle
with the legislative intent, an unnecessary step under Act 627
where the legislative intent on retroactivity was specified. The
authors believe that the omission in Act 709 of these specifications
does not represent any change in the legislative intent.
CLASSIFICATION AS SEPARATE OR COMMUNITY
In Act 627 of 1978, few substantial changes were made in the
158. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2328 (Supp. 1979).
159. 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 11.
160. 1978 La. Acts No. 627, § 9.
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classification of property under the legal community regime. Property
of married persons remained either separate or community.' In one
case, property previously classified as community' was reclassified
as separate-the husband's personal injury award or recovery.6 '
Under another provision of the 1978 legislation, the privilege the
wife enjoyed under former Civil Code article 2386, to maintain the
separate character of the fruits of her separate property,1"4 was ex-
tended to the husband."5 As to earnings of the spouses while living
separate and apart, the legislative decision in 1978 was to classify
that income as community. 6
More subtle refinements of the classification provisions of Act
627 were accomplished by Act 709 of 1979. In two provisions of Act
627, reference was made to the "fruits and revenues" of property. 7
161. LA. R.S. 9:2837 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979).
162. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2334, as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 679, § 1 (repealed
1979), provided in pertinent part: "Actions for damages resulting from offenses and
quasi offenses suffered by the husband, living separate and apart from his wife, by
reason of fault on her part, sufficient for separation or divorce shall be his separate
property." Under the omnibus clause of the same article, community property is "that
which is acquired ... in any manner different from that above declared." Thus, all
other damages suffered by the husband would be classified as community.
163. LA. R.S. 9:2840 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979) provided:
When an offense or quasi offense is committed against the person of a spouse
during the existence of the community regime, the recovery or award for the
damages sustained is the separate property of the injured spouse; but the portion
thereof that is attributable to compensation for the expenses incurred as a result
of the injury during the existence of the regime, or in compensation for the loss of
community earnings, is community property.
164. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2386 (repealed 1979) provided:
The fruits of the paraphernal property of the wife wherever the property be
located and however administered, whether natural, civil, including interest,
dividends and rents, or from the result of labor, fall into the conjugal partnership,
if there exists a community of acquets and gains; unless the wife, by written in-
strument, shall declare that she reserves all of such fruits for her own separate
use and benefit and her intention to administer such property separately and
alone. The said instrument shall be executed before a Notary Public and two
witnesses and duly recorded in the Conveyance Records of the Parish where the
community is domiciled.
165. LA. R.S. 9:2839(5) (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979). For the text of this provision,
see note 167, infra.
166. LA. R.S. 9:2838(1) (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979) provided: "Each spouse owns a
present undivided one-half interest in the community property. The community prop-
erty comprises: (1) Things acquired during the legal regime through the effort, skill, or
industry of either spouse . ..."
167. LA. R.S. 9:2838 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979) provided in pertinent part: "Each
spouse owns a present undivided one-half interest in the community property. The
community property comprises: . . . .(5) Fruits and revenues of community property;
(6) Fruits and revenues of separate property except as otherwise provided in R.S.
9:2839.
LA. R.S. 9:2839(5) (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979) provided:
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Being a more inclusive term than "fruits," "revenues" included
payments resulting from the sale or lease of a mineral interest and
other future payments of a similar nature which would not be tradi-
tionally defined as "fruits." Obviously, the choice of the word
"revenues," which resulted in identical treatment of fruits and those
payments, was a policy decision. However, in Act 709, "revenues"
was deleted; and "natural and civil fruits ... and bonuses, delay ren-
tals, and shut-in payments arising from mineral leases" ' was
substituted. The substitution of language was purposeful; the word
"revenues" was considered too inclusive and undefined by the Civil
Code. Conspicuously absent from the enumeration found in Act 709
are oil royalties; therefore, the issue is posed whether or not
royalties are included in the term "fruits." If not "fruits," oil
royalties retain the classification of the property, or mineral in-
terest, from which derived.
Under article 551 of the Civil Code regulating the rights of the
usufructuary, "fruits" are defined as "things that are produced by or
derived from another thing without diminution of its substance."
Civil fruits are further defined as "revenues derived from a thing by
operation of law or by reason of a juridical act, such as rentals, in-
terest, and certain corporate distributions." '
Applying those definitions to the oil royalty is difficult for oil
royalties represent payments for extraction of minerals which does
result in a diminution of the substance of the thing. Yet, under past
Louisiana jurisprudence, oil royalty payments were considered
analogous to "rents," thus civil fruits. 0 Comment (c) to article 551
declares that mineral substances and the proceeds of mineral rights
are not fruits, because their production results in "depletion of the
property." Yet the remainder of the same comment states: "Never-
theless, mineral substances extracted from the ground, the proceeds
of mineral rights, and the revenues of regularly exploited mines or
quarries may .. .belong to the usufructuary or they may fall into
A spouse owns his or her separate property to the exclusion of the other.
The separate property of the spouses comprises:
(5) The fruits and revenues of the separate property of a spouse accruing
after an act passed before a notary public and two witnesses reserving them as
the separate property of the spouse has been filed for registry in the mortgage
records of the parish where the spouse is domiciled and, if the fruits and revenues
are derived from immovable property, in the mortgage records of the parish
where the immovable is situated ....
168. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2339 (Supp. 1979).
169. LA. CIV. CODE art. 551, as amended by 1976 La. Acts, No. 103 (emphasis
added).
170. See McElwee v. McElwee, 255 So. 2d 883 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
260 La. 862, 257 So. 2d 434 (1972).
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the community of acquets and gains." As authority for the foregoing
statement in the comment, provisions of the Mineral Code"' are
cited. Article 561 provides that the Mineral Code governs a usufruc-
tuary's rights to minerals.' As to mines and quarries already opened,
the Mineral Code originally provided that the usufructuary had an
imperfect usufruct over minerals produced thereform.'" Since he
had to account to the naked owner at termination of the usufruct, 7'
it was obvious that such minerals and payments derived therefrom
were not fruits.' However, in 1975 section 194 was amended to
eliminate the obligation of the usufructuary to account; thus, by
specific legislation minerals subject to a usufruct are to be con-
sidered the equivalent of "fruits" under the Mineral Code.'7
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude, after examining the statutes
and comments, that oil royalties, not being "fruits" and specifically ex-
cluded from the enumeration of other payments derived from mineral
interests, are to retain the classification of the property or interest
from which derived. If so, prior Louisiana decisions 7M have been
171. LA. R.S. 31:188-96 (Supp. 1974). LA. CIv. CODE art. 551 comment (h), added by
1976 La. Acts, No. 103, provides: "They may fall into the community of acquets and
gains by virtue of directly applicable provisions rather than as the result of their
classification as fruits.
172. LA. CiV. CODE art. 561, as amended by 1976 La. Acts, No. 103, provides: "The
rights of the usufructuary and of the naked owner in mines and quarries are governed
by the Mineral Code."
173. LA. R.S. 31:190-94 (Supp. 1974).
174. LA. R.S. 31:194 (Supp. 1974) provides:
A usufructuary of land benefitting under Article 190 or 191 or a usufructuary
of a mineral right is obligated to account to the naked owner of the land or of the
mineral right for production of the value thereof or any other income to which he
is entitled. The accounting for production or the value thereof shall be on the
basis of the price received by the usufructuary or, if the production was used or
disposed of by the usufructuary other than by sale, on the basis of the value at
the time of severance. The usufructuary is also obligated to reserve and give or
pay to the naked owner such portion of the production or the value thereof as
may be necessary to pay income and severance taxes due.
LA. R.S. 31:194, comment (Supp. 1974) provides:
Article 194 limits the usufructuary of land who has rights in minerals under
Articles 190 or 191 and the usufructuary of a mineral right to the benefits of an
imperfect usufruct in that they must account to the naked owners on termination
of the usufruct. The accounting is to be on the basis of the value received or, if
production is disposed of other than by sale, on the basis of value at the time of
severance. A consequence of making the usufruct in these cases imperfect is that
the income can then be viewed as attributable to the naked owner ....
175. LA. CIV. CODE art. 550, as amended by 1976 La. Acts, No. 103, provides: "The
usufructuary is entitled to the fruits of the thing subject to usufruct according to the
following articles."
175a. LA. R.S. 31:194 (1975) provides: "A usufructuary of land benefiting under Arti-
cle 190 or 191 or a usufructuary of a mineral right is not obigated to account to the naked
owner of the land or of the mineral right for production or the value thereof or any other
income to which he is entitled."
176. See note 170, supra.
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legislatively overruled and a significant change in classification from
that of Act 627 accomplished.
Related to the legal issue of classification is the presumption
under former Civil Code articles 2402 and 2405 that property ac-
quired during the marriage is community.'1 7 Under Act 627, the
presumption was extended to include all property possessed by the
spouses during the marriage, but neither spouse was precluded from
proving the separate character of property.' 8 The latter section of
Act 627 overruled the jurisprudence which imposed upon the hus-
band the necessity of including in his acts of acquisition "the double
declaration."'79 The presumption that property possessed during the
marriage is community and the ability of the spouses to rebut that
presumption with evidence to the contrary were unchanged by arti-
cle 2340 of Act 709.
Although the fact that the community may not be judicially par-
titioned during its existence was never doubted under Louisiana's
community property laws,° Act 709 specifically so provides.'81 The
community of acquets and gains as a mass of property is dedicated
to the purpose of furthering the interests of the family and,
therefore, must remain intact to accomplish that purpose. It was un-
necessary before 1978 to include such a provision because husband
and wife could not sue each other during the existence of the regime
except for enumerated causes.'8 ' However, in 1979, Revised Statute
9:291 was amended to allow husband and wife to sue each other for
"causes of action arising out of ... the provisions of Title VI, Book
III of the Civil Code .... .""I Since each owns an undivided one-half
interest in community property,'" arguably either could enforce that
ownership interest by seeking a judicial partition.' Therefore, it
was necessary in Act 709 to specifically prohibit such suits for the
177. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2340 (Supp. 1979).
178. LA. R.S. 9:2838 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979). LA. R.S. 9:2838, comment (c)
(Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979) provided: "This Section reproduces the substance of Arti-
cle 2405 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 as interpreted by the Louisiana
jurisprudence."
179. See, e.g., Slaton v. King, 214 La. 89, 36 So. 2d 648 (1948), and cases cited
therein; Phillips v. Nereaux, 357 So. 2d 813 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
180. See, e.g., Azar v. Azar, 239 La. 941, 120 So. 2d 485 (1960). See generally H.
DAGGETT, THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM OF LOUISIANA (1945).
181. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2336 (Supp. 1979).
182. LA. R.S. 9:291 (1950) (as it existed prior to 1979 La. Acts, No. 711).
183. LA. R.S. 9:291, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 711.
184. LA. R.S. 9:2838 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979).
185. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1289. Under Revised Statutes 9:291, the specific provision
that either spouse can enforce a cause of action arising out of the Civil Code articles
governing matrimonial regimes, including new article 2336, necessitated a provision
prohibiting partition of the community property during the existence of the regime.
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policy reasons previously discussed. In furtherance of the same
policy objectives, another provision prohibits a spouse's alienation of
his undivided interest in the community or in particular things of
the community.18 If an undivided interest is sold to a third person, it
makes the other spouse a co-owner with a stranger and could ac-
complish indirectly what is prohibited directly-a judicial partition
of the community.
Introduced in Act 627 was a provision with no parallel in the
Civil Code articles-a "declaration of separateness."1 8 7 The provision
was enacted so that a spouse could manage his separate property
alone, irrespective of the presumption that all property possessed
by the spouses is community. For example, in the case of immovable
property, if presumed community, the consent of both spouses was
necessary for its alienation or encumbrance. '88 If in the act of ac-
quisition it is declared that the husband is purchasing the property
with separate funds, the declaration cannot be set aside by the wife
should it be false. Properly interpreted, this provision was an excep-
tion to the rule that an unauthorized alienation by one spouse can be
avoided by the other. Thus, the wife's sole remedy in the foregoing
example was damages on account of the fraudulent management of
community property.188 Under the language of section 2839 in Act
627, it was apparent that if the third person was cognizant of the
falsity of the declaration, he was not protected.
After examining the language and purpose of the provision, it is
obvious that the enunciated rule of law pertains to management of
property because it affects who has the power to alienate property
during the existence of the legal regime. The provision does not
classify the property as separate or community; it is community as
between the spouses if the declaration is false. Instead, it addresses
directly the problem of what declarations may be relied upon by a
third person. However, in Act 709 "the declaration of separateness"
186. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2337 (Supp. 1979) provides: "A spouse may not alienate, en-
cumber, or lease to a third person his undivided interest in the community or in par-
ticular things of the community prior to the termination of the regime."
187. LA. R.S. 9:2839(2) (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979) provided:
A spouse owns his or her separate property to the exclusion of the other.
The separate property of the spouses comprises:
(2) Things acquired by the spouse with separate assets, including those ac-
quired in exchange for separate assets. The declaration in the act of acquisition
that the things are acquired with the separate assets of the acquiring spouse may
be controverted by the other spouse or by their creditors, but without prejudice
to the rights of third persons .. ..
188. LA. R.S. 9:2843 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979). See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2347 (Supp.
1979).
189. LA. R.S. 9:2846 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979).
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provision does not appear in the section of the Civil Code governing
management, but rather in that regulating classification of property.
The first paragraph of article 2342190 is more explicit than its
counterpart in Act 627. Consistent with past jurisprudence involving
transactions by the wife, 9' the declaration cannot be controverted
by a spouse who concurs in the act. However, it may be con-
troverted by the forced heirs and creditors of the spouses even if
there is a concurrence.' The second paragraph of article 2342 con-
tains the substance of section 2839, but the statutory language is ab-
solute, rather than qualified. In the comments which follow article
2342, an explanation of its application is given:
Thus, a court may determine that the things were actually
acquired with community funds and are community property.
This determination produces effects between the spouses and
toward creditors and forced heirs as long as the thing is owned
by the acquiring spouse. But it is without effect as to things that
have been transferred by onerous transaction to a third person.
That person acquires ownership from the transferor spouse in
reliance on the declaration in the act by which the transferor ac-
quired the thing that it is separate property.'9'
There is no indication in the statutory language of article 2342 nor
in the comments thereto that if the third person is not in fact ac-
quiring the property in reliance on the declaration and is cognizant
of its falsity that the transaction may be annulled by the other
spouse. Never was it the intention of the Joint Legislature Subcom-
mittee that this provision could be used by one spouse as an effec-
tive means of defrauding the other. The Subcommittee did consider
the serious problem of fraud, since it could easily be accomplished
by "the declaration" and the absence of a concurrence requirement
for the purchase of community immovable property." Presumably,
190. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2342 (Supp. 1979) provides in pertinent part:
A declaration in an act of acquisition that things are acquired with separate
funds as separate property of a spouse may be controverted by the other spouse
unless he concurs in the act. It may also be controverted by the forced heirs and
the creditors of the spouses, despite the concurrence by the other spouse.
191. E.g., McElwee v. McElwee, 255 So. 2d 883 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
192. Minden Chamber of Commerce v. Goodman, 243 So. 2d 843 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1971); Succession of Winsey, 170 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 247
La. 615, 172 So. 2d 701 (1965). LA. CIv. CODE art. 2342 (Supp. 1979) provides in perti-
nent part: "Nevertheless, when there has been such a declaration, a transfer of the
thing by onerous title may not be set aside by a spouse, or by the creditors or forced
heirs of the spouses."
193. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2342, comment (a) (Supp. 1979).
194. The Joint Legislative Subcommittee during the first two hearings held pur-
suant to Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 54 of 1977 rejected a concurrence require-
ment for the purchase of immovable property. Some of the other six community prop-
erty states with an "equal management" scheme, such as Washington, do have concur-
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the article will be interpreted as originally intended, that is, as a
means of protecting innocent third persons who are not active or
passive participants in interspousal fraud.
MANAGEMENT OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
The most controversial issue in the lengthy course of the
matrimonial regimes law revision and, indeed, the issue that
originally prompted the revision, was that of management of the
community property."" By enacting Act 627 of 1978, the legislature
finally chose equal management of the community property by the
spouses as the general rule of management.' As part of the new
scheme of management, the legislature also required concurrence of
the spouses for certain enumerated transactions 1 7 and gave ex-
clusive management of other transactions to one spouse.' Desiring
that the version of equal management ultimately to take effect be
more refined than that in Act 627, but not wishing to rekindle
debate on the new management scheme, the legislature ordained an
interim study of Act 627 by the Law Institute, limited to improving
the expression and furthering the implementation of the policy
already determined and enunciated in the Act. 99 The Law Institute
complied by making its revisions to Act 627 consistent with Act
627's equal management scheme, although disclaiming all respon-
sibility for any chaos, corruption, or calamity that equal manage-
ment might occasion."' Consequently, Act 709 contains no major
changes in the management scheme of Act 627.
Several variations between the two acts are, however, more
than semantical. One such variation occurs in the enumeration of
acts requiring concurrence of the spouses. Whereas Act 627 re-
quired concurrence for the alienation, encumbrance, or lease of com-
munity furniture or furnishings in use in the family home, 2 1 Act 709
rence requirements for the acquisition of real property. See Cross, Community Prop-
erty. A Comparison of the Systems in Washington and Louisiana, 39 LA. L. REV. 480,
486-87 (1979). The omission of such a requirement from Act 627 is noted by one com-
mentator. McClendon, Louisiana's New Matrimonial Regime Law: Some Aspects of
the Effects on Real Estate Practice, 39 LA. L. REV. 442, 471 (1979).
195. See Spaht, Background of Matrimonial Regimes Revision, 39 LA. L. REV. 323
(1979).
196. LA. R.S. 9:2841-42 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979).
197. LA. R-S. 9:2843 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979).
198. LA. R.S. 9:2844-45 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979).
199. La. H.R. Con. Res. No. 232, 4th Reg. Sess. (1978).
200. Letter from William E. Crawford, Director of Louisiana State Law Institute,
to Senator Thomas A. Casey, accompanying transmission of RECOMMENDATION, supra
note 42: "It is very clear that the enclosed proposal does not represent the substantive
result the Institute would have reached with the exercise of its independent judgment
in the absence of the significant principles already established in Act 627."
201. LA. R.S, 9:2843(2) (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979).
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requires concurrence in these transactions involving "furniture or
furnishings while located in the family home." 02 Under Act 627, if
the wife removed the family television set from the family home
where it was being used and sold it to a good faith purchaser, the
sale would have been voidable by the husband. " During the debate
on Act 627, concern was expressed as to how a prospective pur-
chaser of furniture typically used in a home would know whether
the furniture was actually used in the home of the seller-spouse. The
legislature decided to place the risk of dealing with one spouse
alone, where home furniture is concerned, on the third party, in the
interest of insuring the other spouse's participation in the disposal
or encumbrance of these essential family assets.
The Law Institute felt that this result was inconsistent with the
general rule which the institute intended to recommend to the 1979
legislature for the transfer of ownership of corporeal movables by a
possessor. This rule, subsequently enacted, provides: "A transferee
in good faith for fair value acquires the ownership of a corporeal
movable, if the transferor, though not owner, has possession with
the consent of the owner, as pledgee, lessee, depositary or other
person of similar standing."' 2° The Law Institute apparently thought
that in the example of the television set, the new provision on the
transfer of ownership would mean that the sale could not be annuled
by the husband. It is not clear, because of the difficulty in applying
the provision on transfer of ownership to a community movable,
whether this result would have followed. Who is "the owner" of a
community movable when each spouse owns a present undivided
one-half interest in the community property?25 Is the transferor-
spouse by virtue of the legal regime automatically a person of
similar standing to a pledgee, lessee, or despositary of the
nontransferor-spouse? The applicability of the transfer of ownership
provision to community movables should have been discussed rather
than assumed; if the provision was inapplicable, then there was no
reason to alter the language of Act 627's concurrence requirement
for transactions involving furniture and furnishings in use in the
family home. Nevertheless, to protect the good faith transferee for
value of a corporeal movable, as the provision attempts to do, the
Law Institute recommended total deletion of transactions involving
family home furniture and furnishings from the list of transactions
requiring concurrence of the spouses.2" The Joint Legislative Sub-
committee was unwilling to abandon entirely the concurrence re-
202. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2347 (Supp. 1979).
203. LA. R.S. 9:2846 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979).
204. 1979 La. Acts, No. 180, amending LA. CIV. CODE art. 520.
205. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2336 (Supp. 1979).
206. RECOMMENDATION, supra note 42, proposed LA. CIV. CODE art. 2347.
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quirement where family furniture was concerned1 7 and reached a
compromise in the language ultimately enacted in Act 709. Under
Act 709, in the example of the television set, the sale would be
voidable by the husband only if the television set was sold in place
while located in the family home."' Once removed from the family
home, furniture is subject to the power of either spouse acting alone
to dispose of or encumber it. The compromise concurrence require-
ment at least prevents one spouse from secretly placing a chattel
mortgage on furniture located in the home without the consent of
the other spouse, an act which could have been accomplished under
the Law Institute recommendation.
Article 2348 of Act 709 restates more clearly than did Act 6271,
that a spouse whose concurrence would be required for an act may,
with respect to particular community property, renounce in advance
the right to concur. The new wording, plus the explanatory com-
ment, makes it clear that the renouncing spouse does not, merely by
renouncing the right to concur, become a party to the transaction
for which concurrence would have been required. 10 The second
sentence in article 2348 is new and states that a spouse may also re-
nounce the right to participate in the management of a community
enterprise. This relates to the "business exception" to the general
rule of equal management whereby "the spouse who is sole manager
of a community enterp Iise has the exclusive right to alienate, en-
cumber, or lease its mo ables .... 211 The exclusive management for
which the business exception provides does not arise when both
spouses are participating in the management of the business. In that
case each spouse could equally manage the untitled movable assets
of the business. 1 ' Act 627 did not explicitly recognize a spouse's
right to participate in the management of a community business run
by the other spouse; however, that right was implicit in the spouses'
relationship as co-owners and equal managers generally of the com-
munity property."' The business exception was intended to apply
only if one spouse voluntarily refrained from participating in the
management of the business; it did not mean that a spouse could be
involuntarily and completely excluded from such participation. The
second sentence of article 2348 of Act 709 indirectly acknowledges
207. See La. H.B. No. 798 (original version), proposed LA. CIV. CODE art. 2347, 5th
Reg. Sess. (1979).
208. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2353 (Supp. 1979).
209. LA. R.S. 9:2843 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979).
210. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2348, comment (b) (Supp. 1979). See Spaht, supra note 2, at
554.
211. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2350 (Supp. 1979).
212. If any of the movable assets are titled as required by law, management of
those assets would depend on the management rules for titled movables rather than
the general equal management rules. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2347 & 2350-51 (Supp. 1979).
213. LA. R.S. 9:2838 & 2842 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979).
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the right to participate in the management of a community business.
A spouse who has not renounced the right to participate cannot be
excluded from the business.
When the right to participate has been renounced, the question
may arise as to whether the renunciation will be effective against
third parties who have no notice of it. There is no requirement in
Act 709 for recordation of the renunciation and, since only movables
are involved, the general law does not require recordation. The
spouse who has renounced, and who thereafter attempts to par-
ticipate in the business in order to sell a movable asset of the
business to a third party, can hardly be expected to produce the
renunciation. Therefore, how will the third party know if a spouse
has disabled himself by renunciation from acting as an equal
manager of the community business? If the renunciation affects
third parties, then the result is contrary to the legislative intent of
article 2330, which, for the protection of third parties, does not allow
a spouse by matrimonial agreement to restrict his powers as an
equal manager. 1 ' The second sentence of article 2348 would incon-
sistently permit a spouse unilaterally to restrict his equal manage-
ment power with respect to a community business. Thus, in order to
avoid violating the objectives of article 2330, the renunciation should
not be regarded as affecting third parties.
Another variation between the two acts is the remedy for an
unauthorized alienation, encumbrance, or lease of community prop-
erty. Both acts allow damages for fraud or bad faith management of
the community property as a remedy between the spouses,"6 but
they differ slightly as to the remedy against third parties. Act 627
made any unauthorized act concerning community property
avoidable at the instance of the other spouse. ' Article 2353 of Act
709 dictates this result with respect to acts done by a spouse in
violation of the concurrence requirement and with respect to the
"business exception,"' but does not dictate relative nullity for an
act done in violation of the management rules governing movables
registered in one spouse's name" or partnership interests.19 The
214. See text at notes 128-32, supra.
215. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2354 (Supp. 1979); LA. R.S. 9:2846 (Supp. 1978) (repealed
1979).
216. LA. R.S. 9:2846 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979).
217. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2353 (Supp. 1979). The "business exception" is the right that
a spouse managing a community business without the participation of the other spouse
has to be the exclusive manager of the movable assets of the business. See LA. CIV.
CODE art. 2350 (Supp. 1979). The voidability of transactions by the non-manager spouse
would be an exception to amended article 520, which makes valid the transfer of
ownership of a corporeal movable to a good faith purchaser by a person in possession
with consent of the owner, even if the article were clearly applicable to community
property. For the text of article 520, see text at note 204, supra.
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omission does not signify legislative intent to make the management
rules governing movables registered in one spouse's name or govern-
ing partnership interests effective only between the spouses.
Rather, the legislature intended that the general law be consulted to
determine if the transaction can be avoided in the unlikely event
that a spouse sells or encumbers a movable registered in the name
of the other spouse or an interest in a partnership in which the
other spouse was a partner. Unfortunately, the general law offers no
clear answer because of the ownership and management rules that
are peculiar to community property. For example, Civil Code article
2452, declaring that the sale of a thing belonging to another is null,
does not precisely fit the situation in which a spouse disposes of a
community car registered in the name of the spouse, since the
"thing" belongs equally to the seller and his spouse. Likewise,
analogy to an agent exceeding his authority is problematic since the
spouses are not co-mandataries with respect to community property
transactions.20 Nor can the answer be that the seller-spouse has con-
veyed his undivided one-half interest in the property, since article
2337 prohibits a spouse from disposing of his undivided interest in a
particular community thing prior to termination of the regime.
21
With respect to registered corporeal movables, new article 520,
whereby a person in possession of a corporeal movable can, with
consent of the owner, transfer title to a good faith transferee for
value, is explicitly made inapplicable.22 The various registration
laws for movables may not offer solutions. In the case of vehicle ti-
tle registration laws, the jurisprudence has held that the transfer of
ownership of a vehicle is governed by the Civil Code despite non-
compliance with the Vehicle Certificate of Title Law . 28 Similar
jurisprudence can be found under the old Uniform Stock Transfer
Act."4 Title laws for movables are intended to protect the transferee
of the person whose name is on the title by declaring the transfer
unassailable and by giving the transferee an action for breach of
contract if a properly endorsed certificate cannot be delivered."5
218. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2351 (Supp. 1979).
219. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2352 (Supp. 1979).
220. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2346, comment (b) (Supp. 1979).
221. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2337 (Supp. 1979).
222. 1979 La. Acts, No. 180, amending LA. CIv. CODE art. 525 provides: "The provi-
sions of this chapter do not apply to movables that are required by law to be
registered in public records."
223. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 525, comment (b), as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No.
180.
224. LA. R.S. 12:624 (1950) (repealed 1978). The subject is now governed by LA. R.S.
10:8-308 to 310 (Supp. 1978). See Finn v. Ponsaa, 308 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 313 So. 2d 238 (La. 1975).
225. Finn v. Ponsaa, 308 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 So. 2d 238
(La. 1975).
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These title laws are not addressed to the situation where the
transferee, having dealt with the spouse of the person whose name
appears on the certificate, wishes to complete the transfer. Common
sense and the negative implication of the title laws indicate that any
transfer by someone whose name does not appear on the certificate
is assailable by the person whose name does appear thereon. But
the grounds for the assault and its extent (i.e., whether the transfer
is an absolute or relative nullity) must be sought in the general law.
For the sake of thoroughness the legislature should amend article
2353 to provide, as did Act 627, that a transaction in violation of any
of the management rules, including those involving registered
movables and partnership interests, is relatively null.
During the interim study the Advisory Committee had recom-
mended a prescription of three years from the day the transaction is
discovered for an action by a spouse to annul an unauthorized trans-
action by the other spouse. The legislature, however, did not enact a
specific prescription for this action, thus necessitating a search of
the general law for the appropriate prescription. Article 2221, which
provides a ten-year prescription for nullity or rescission of an agree-
ment in cases of certain vices of consent and incapacities,"8 is the
provision most clearly applicable to this situation, since it gave as
an example of its application an unauthorized act executed by a mar-
ried woman. The deletion of that example by other legislation in
197911 should not be taken as relevant to the use of article 2221's
prescription in the situation described; the deletion was simply part
of a comprehensive act removing, among other things, all references
in the Civil Code to the incapacities of married women.22 If article
2221 does not provide the appropriate prescription, then article
3542, providing a five-year prescription for the nullity or rescission
of contracts, may arguably be applicable. It is to be hoped that in
the next session the legislature will adopt the preferable, shorter
three-year prescriptive period. This period is of sufficient length to
allow a spouse a fair opportunity to annul an unauthorized transac-
tion, yet its brevity provides security of transactions to third par-
ties.
TERMINATION
Of all the provisions in the matrimonial regimes legislation, the
section regulating rights upon dissolution2" has received the least
public discussion. Articles 23572" and 2357.131 reflect the underlying
226. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2221.
227. 1979 La. Acts, No. 711, amending LA. CIv. CODE art. 2221.
228. See 1979 La. Acts, No. 711.
229. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2357 & 2357.1 (Supp. 1979).
230. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2357 (Supp. 1979) provides:
An obligation incurred by a spouse before or during the community property
regime, may be satisfied after termination of the regime from the property of the
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policies sought to be accomplished in the 1978 legislation. In fact,
the statutory language of those two articles is in almost all respects
identical to the corresponding provisions of Act 627.232
At termination of the community regime for one of the causes
listed in article 2356,23' articles 2357 and 2357.1 regulate the rights
of the spouses' creditors for obligations incurred prior to dissolu-
tion"3 ' of that regime. A proposal to impose responsibility equally on
spouses at dissolution for one-half of the community obligations,
regardless of who contracted them, was rejected by the
legislature. 85 The provisions of the above-cited articles neither
govern the rights of post-dissolution creditors, as at least one other
author has noted,"'6 nor do they determine the rights of a co-owner
spouse against the other.27 The articles attempt to identify property
former community and from the separate property of the spouse who incurred the
obligation.
If a spouse disposes of property of the former community for a purpose other
than the satisfaction of community obligations, he is liable for all obligations in-
curred by the other spouse up to the value of that community property.
231. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2357.1 (Supp. 1979) provides: "A spouse may by written act
assume responsibility for one-half of each community obligation incurred by the other
spouse. In such case, the assuming spouse may dispose of community property without
incurring further responsibility for the obligations incurred by the other spouse."
232. LA. R.S. 9:2849 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979) provided: "Except as otherwise
provided in this Subpart, upon dissolution of the community regime, the claims of
creditors may be satisfied from the community property and from the separate prop-
erty of the spouse who incurred the obligation."
LA. R.S. 9:2850 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979) provided: "A spouse who accepts the
community expressly and unconditionally upon the dissolution thereof is personally
obligated for one-half the outstanding obligations incurred by the other spouse for the
common interest of the spouses."
233. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2356 (Supp. 1979) provides: "The legal regime of community
property terminates by the death of a spouse or by a judgment of divorce, separation
from bed and board, or separation of property."
234. The language reads as follows: "An obligation incurred by a spouse before or
during the community property regime .... LA. CIv. CODE art. 2357 (Supp. 1979) (em-
phasis added).
No provision regulates the rights of post-dissolution creditors of a spouse. However,
the proper theoretical disposition would be to allow those creditors to execute against
separate property of the debtor spouse and his one-half interest only in property of
the former community. Thus, the pre-dissolution creditors of the debtor spouse are
given greater rights than are post-dissolution creditors, which seems to be a
reasonable distinction. For an excellent discussion of the problem of post-dissolution
creditors, see Bilbe, "Management" of Community Assets Under Act 627, 39 LA. L.
REV. 409 (1979).
235. The proposal was made by the Ad Hoc Committee on Matrimonial Regimes of
the Louisiana State Law Institute, the composition of which included Professor A.N.
Yiannopoulos, reporter, and F.A. Little, Jr., chairman. For a list of the other members
of that special committee, see Spaht, supra note 2, at 556. When the proposal was
presented to the Council of the Louisiana Law Institute, it was rejected.
236. Bilbe, supra note 234, at 435.
237. See subsection entitled Rights Between Spouses on Dissolution, infra.
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available for satisfaction of creditors' pre-dissolution claims at the
termination of the community regime.
Causes of Termination
The causes enumerated for termination of the legal matrimonial
regime include death, a judgment of separation from bed and board,
divorce, or separation of property. 81 Although not included in the
provisions of the article, the comment thereunder reads, "The
enumeration of causes of termination of the legal regime is ex-
clusive.""2 9 Omitted from the enumeration of the causes for termina-
tion of the regime are a judicially approved matrimonial agreement
and dissolution of the community under the articles governing
absentees and upon declaration of nullity.4 0 Yet in another
paragraph of the same legislation, "" the Act provides that a judicially
approved agreement may terminate the legal regime-for example,
a judicially approved separation of property agreement. Although
not specifically enumerated in article 2356, such an agreement does
require a termination of the legal regime, a separation of property
being the antithesis of a community regime.
More difficult to assess at this time is the agreement which
merely modifies the legal regime in certain respects-for example,
an agreement in which one spouse is given the exclusive power to
alienate, encumber, or lease certain community immovable prop-
erty24 2 or in which one spouse's earnings are designated as separate
property. In the former example, the modification does not
necessitate termination of the legal regime; the agreement only
modifies one aspect of management powers over community prop-
erty. Whether the latter example terminates the regime is a more
troublesome question. In such a situation, there is no specific provi-
sion in the contract that the community or legal regime is ter-
minated; certain property is merely reclassified.
Neither the legislation itself nor the comments thereto assist in
resolving the problem, unless significance can be attached to the
238. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2356 (Supp. 1979).
239. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2356, comment (a) (Supp. 1979). 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 7,
provides: "The article headnotes, the expose des motifs and the comments in this Act
are not intended to be considered as part of the law and are not enacted into law by
virtue of their inclusion in this Act."
240. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 63-64; LA. CIv. CODE art. 2329 (repealed 1979). See also
Prince v. Hopson, 230 La. 575, 89 So. 2d 128 (1956); Patton v. Cities of Philadelphia and
New Orleans, 1 La. Ann. 98 (1846). The corresponding provision in Act 627 did contain
in its enumeration of causes for termination a "contract of the spouses." LA. R.S.
9:2848 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979).
241. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2329 (Supp. 1979).
242. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2347 (Supp. 1979). The described provision is one which may
affect third persons under new article 2330.
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omission in article 2367 of "contract." Since the word "contract" had
appeared in the corresponding provision of Act 627, '43 it is possible
that the drafters of article 2356 were of the opinion that the term
was too broad, since not all matrimonial regime contracts terminate
the legal regime. A reasonable approach might be to hold the
matrimonial agreement to be terminated only when the spouses so
stipulate or where the fundamental nature of the community is
altered.
Articles 2357 and 2357.1
To demonstrate the application of articles 2357 and 2357.1, con-
sider the following hypothetical circumstances:
HYPO: H and W are married two years with one child. A judg-
ment of separation from bed and board terminates the community.
H owes A $540 for an obligation he incurred before his marriage,
and he owes B $940 for a mink stole he purchased for his wife on
their first wedding anniversary. W owes C $420 for child care
services rendered and D $350; both debts were incurred prior to
filing of suit for separation. After a judgment of separation from
bed and board is rendered, the spouses voluntarily partition the
community property- W is given ownership of the house; H is
given ownership of the car and the General Electric stock.
Article 2357-Assumption of Obligations
Article 2357 provides:
An obligation incurred by a spouse, before or during the
community property regime may be satisfied after termination
of the regime from the property of the former community and
from the separate property of the spouse who incurred the
obligation.
If a spouse disposes of property of the former community for
a purpose other than the satisfaction of community obligations,
he is liable for all obligations incurred by the other spouse up to
the value of that community property.
Under the first paragraph of article 2357, the four pre-
dissolution creditors in the hypothetical may satisfy their respective
obligations from property of the former community and from the
separate property of the spouse who incurred the obligation. Thus,
by comparing the provisions of articles 2345"' and 2357, dissolution
243. LA. R.S. 9:2848 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979).
244. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2345 (Supp. 1979) provides: "A separate or community
obligation may be satisfied during the community property regime from community
property and from the separate property of the spouse who incurred the obligation."
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of the legal regime affects creditors "only as it results in the
reclassification of assets such as subsequent salaries and fruits and
revenues of separate property which previously have been community
property." '45 Obviously then, the underlying policy of the provision
is not to affect adversely creditors of a spouse when there is a ter-
mination of the legal regime. The voluntary partition of assets,
although enforceable between H and W, cannot affect the four pre-
dissolution creditors.2 4 Upon default by H, A and B can execute
against the house as an asset of the former community. Neither,
however, could garnish the wages of W. If A should seize the house,
in satisfaction of a prenuptial obligation of H, which is categorized
as a separate debt between the spouses, W would be entitled to
recover the entire sum from H under general legal principles such
as breach of warranty, which is implied in a partition,'2 4 dissolution
of the contract for failure of cause, 48 or as a last resort, a quasi-
contractual remedy.2 4'
At first glance, the scheme of article 2357 appears to have the
advantage of simplicity, providing the same rule for satisfaction of
obligations after termination of the regime as during its existence.
However, upon closer examination, questions arise. Identifying prop-
erty of the former community may be difficult, especially since the
creditor assumes the risk of liability for wrongful seizure should he
be mistaken.2 5 If, as in the hypothetical situation, the spouses have
voluntarily partitioned the property of the former community and
W sells the house, is the creditor of H affected? The second
paragraph of article 2357, which did not appear in Act 627, attempts
to solve this problem first by tracing values.2 11 If W sold the house
for $32,000, she is liable for all obligations incurred by H up to the
value of the property conveyed. Thus, W is personally liable to A
245. Bilbe, supra note 234, at 429.
246. Id. at 431. This conclusion is apparent from the statutory language which
refers to property of the "former community."
247. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1384-85, 1387, 1390-91 & 1394. Furthermore, because the
partition is designated as a type of exchange, the warranty is the same as that in a
sale. Jeannin v. Bouman, 2 Pelt. 64 (Or]. App. 1918).
248. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 1897-98.
249. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 1965 & 2292-300. In this-case the articles regulating the
quasi-contract resulting from the management of another's affairs may not be ap-
plicable because they assume that such quasi-contracts are the result of purely volun-
tary acts of man. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2293. However, the remedy of unjust enrich-
ment may be available. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1965.
250. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3506 (damages for wrongful issuance of writ of attach-
ment or sequestration). LA. R.S. 13:3880 (Supp. 1978); Cox v. Smith, 275 So. 2d 459 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1973).
251. The problem presented by the hypothetical was mentioned in Professor
Bilbe's article. See Bilbe, supra note 234, at 431.
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for $540, since $32,000 exceeds the amount of the indebtedness.
Despite the provisions of the first paragraph of article 2357, her
salary may now be garnished in satisfaction of that obligation. Ob-
viously, in the particular hypothetical, tracing of values is not very
difficult since the sale of an immovable is normally in writing 52 and
recorded. "8 If the transaction involved movables, the problem of
tracing values would be more difficult.
Legislatively, the only exception to the imposition of personal
liability upon W is the case where she disposed of the house to
satisfy other community obligations. Again, there are problems of
interpretation. What if W used $320 of the $32,000 in satisfaction of
the D bill which was a community obligation?" ' May A seek satisfac-
tion of the entire amount of his obligation by garnishing W's wages
since she did not dispose of the entire $32,000 in satisfaction of com-
munity obligations? Or, is he precluded from garnishing her wages
because she used some portion of the value received for satisfaction
of a community obligation? Or instead, is he entitled to partial
satisfaction of his obligation, for example, the difference between
$540 and $320? In solving the problem, it is necessary to resort to
the purpose underlying the second paragraph, which is to maintain
for the benefit of unpaid pre-dissolution creditors the property of
the former community, or its value, for the satisfaction of their
debts. Thus, under the facts proposed, A should be entitled to gar-
nish W's wages for the entire amount due and owing by H.
More difficult to resolve is the issue of disposition of monies
received from the transfer of a community asset for a purpose other
than the payment of community obligations. For example, there may
be a disposition of assets to support the current living expenses of
the wife and the child in her care. In fact, it is probably for the pay-
ment of such expenses that W is more apt to sell the house. The
legislation is specific in its language-"other than the satisfaction of
community obligations." It was never intended, however, that ex-
penditure of such funds for current living expenses should impose
personal responsibility for obligations of the other spouse. 5 Future
amendments to this provision should address and satisfactorily solve
the problem.
If A garnishes W's wages, which are now reclassified as
separate property, in satisfaction of H's separate obligation, W
252. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2275.
253. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2265.
254. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2360 (Supp. 1979).
255. Although never specifically discussed by the Joint Legislative Subcommittee,
the authors are of the opinion that it would never have been the intent of the
legislators to impose personal liability for expenditures for current living expenses.
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should be entitled to idemnification from him. Again, the underlying
purpose sought to be accomplished by the legislation is the iden-
tification of assets subject to the creditors' claims, not determina-
tion of ultimate responsibility as between the spouses. Such a con-
clusion is reasonable because the responsibility imposed is determined
by the value of the property disposed of, not by the amount of the
obligation.25 W and H are bound for the same debt to A, one in
law2 57 and one in contract; thus they are liable in solidum to the
creditor."8 Since imperfect solidarity exists between H and W, she
has a right to recompense from H.259 In this Case W can recover the
whole sum, since the affair concerns only one of the co-debtors.10
The result is similar to instances of recovery by a surety from the
principal,"' although theoretically responsibility to the creditor is
different. The surety is only liable to the creditor if the principal
debtor defaults on the obligation."2 Under article 2357 there is no
secondary obligation of the wife to pay upon default by the husband;
her obligation to the creditor is a principal one which she incurs
because of her disposition of community assets.
Mention must be made of comment (b) to article 2357, which pro-
vides: "When one remarries under a community property regime,
his share of the new community is separate property for the pur-
poses of Article 2357." This comment is misleading and probably un-
necessary. If W, after termination and the voluntary partition,
remarries under a community property regime, her premarital
creditors may seek satisfaction from her separate property and all
of the community property of the second marriage.261 Creditors of H,
such as A, are limited to seeking satisfaction from identifiable assets
of the former community in her possession; thus, considering her
share of the second community as her separate property does not
benefit A, who does not have access to her separate property
anyway. If W disposes of the assets of the first community, she
becomes liable to A and incurs a personal responsibility, capable of
256. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2357 (Supp. 1979) provides in pertinent part: "If a spouse
disposes of property of the former community for a purpose other than the satisfaction
of community obligations, he is liable for all obligations incurred by the other spouse
up to the value of that community property.'" (Emphasis added.)
257. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2357 (Supp. 1979).
258. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2092. For an excellent article discussing the origins of im-
perfect solidarity and Louisiana cases on the subject, see The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Obligations, 35 LA. L. REV. 280, 291-98
(1975).
259. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2103.
260. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2106.
261. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3035-63.
262. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3035 & 3045.
263. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2345 (Supp. 1979).
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satisfaction from her separate property and all of the property of
the second community. Protection of creditors of the first marriage
was unnecessary, and the comment creates confusion as to the pro-
per application of article 2345 when there is a remarriage. Are those
premarital creditors, who are asserting rights by virtue of the provi-
sions of article 2357, restricted to seizing only one-half of the com-
munity property of the second marriage? As a general principle,
such a result was rejected by the Joint Legislative Subcommittee.'
Article 2357.1-Express assumption
Article 2357.1 provides: "A spouse may by written act assume
responsibility for one-half of each community obligation incurred by
the other spouse. In such case, the assuming spouse may dispose of
community property without incurring further responsibility for the
obligation incurred by the other spouse."
Under article 2357 a spouse cannot determine exactly and finally
his ultimate responsibility to creditors of the other spouse even
when there has been a voluntary partition.6 ' However, in Article
2357.1, the legislation provides an alternative to this indefinite
liability.
Although poorly phrased, the equivalent of an express assump-
tion of responsibility first appeared in Act 627.1" After enactment of
the provision in 1978, the Joint Legislative Subcommittee agreed
that the Act be amended to clarify the intended effects of the ex-
press "acceptance." 'u7 However, it was not until hearings in March of
1979 that the language of article 2357.1 and its interrelationship
with article 2357 were formulated.2"
264. See Bilbe, supra note 234, at 412.
265. Since husband and wife on termination may be considered liable in solidum,
see text at notes 258-62, supra, a possible method for establishing a definitive parti-
tion, as defined by article 1295, would be negotiating either a novation or remission.
See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2185-98, 2201-03. These articles deal with novation and remis-
sion of the solidarity and the debt, respectively, of co-debtors in solido. For a descrip-
tion of the somewhat analogous situation resulting today when the husband remains
liable for the whole of the community debts because he incurred them even when the
wife accepts the community, see Comment, The Fictitious Community and the Right
to Partition, 30 LA. L. REV. 603, 610 n.38 (1970).
266. LA. R.S. 9:2850 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979). For the text of this provision, see
note 232, supr.
267. See Spaht, supra note 2, at 555. The recommended change in language was as
follows: "A spouse who accepts the community expressly and unconditionally upon the
dissolution thereof is entitled to one-half of the assets and is personally obligated for
one-half of the outstanding obligations incurred by the other spouse for the common in-
terest of the spouses."
268. These hearings were conducted by the Joint Legislative Subcommittee to
receive recommendations from both the Louisiana State Law Institute and the ad-
visory committee. Id. at 556-57.
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As Professor Bilbe succinctly explained: "If an express accep-
tance permitted the accepting spouse to insulate his or her share of
community assets from his or her spouse's community creditors by
paying them one-half of what they are owed, the utility of an ex-
press acceptance would be clear." ' With this avowed purpose, as
well as the desirability of some definitive responsibility, article
2357.1 was drafted.
By written act, as contrasted with tacit acceptance of the com-
munity by the wife," a spouse may assume responsibility "for one-
half of each community obligation incurred by the other spouse."' 1'
Initially, the assuming spouse incurs personal responsibility, which
had not previously existed. It is accomplished by unilateral act and
need not be concurred in by the other spouse. Upon execution of the
act, all of the property of the assuming spouse becomes responsible,
including that classified as separate, to community creditors for one-
half of the community obligations of the other. A community obliga-
tion is defined as one incurred during the existence of a community
regime "for the common interest of the spouses or for the interest
of the other spouse .... ""2 The definition is made more inclusive
than that of Act 62713 by including an obligation incurred for the in-
terest of the other spouse. Yet, in this context, it is inoffensive; for
it is the other spouse, in whose interest the obligation was incurred,
who is assuming responsibility for one-half of the amount due.
In contrast to article 2357, after an express assumption, "the
assuming spouse may dispose of community property without incur-
ring further responsibility for the obligations incurred by the other
spouse.''2 The purpose sought to be accomplished by this language
is a definitive partition" 5 and responsibility for obligations of the
other. No qualifying language appears in article 2357.1 after "com-
269. Bilbe, supra note 234, at 430.
270. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2412 (repealed 1979).
271. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2357.1 (Supp. 1979).
272. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2360 (Supp. 1979).
273. LA. R.S. 9:2852(G) (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979) provided:
Separate obligations include obligations incurred prior to the establishment
of the community regime, obligations resulting from intentional torts, and obliga-
tions incurred for the benefit of the separate estate of one spouse to the extent
that it does not inure to the benefit of the community or of the family. All other
obligations incurred by a spouse during the existence of the community regime
are presumed to have been incurred for the common interests of the spouses.
Alimentary obligations imposed by law on a spouse shall be deemed to have been
incurred during the existence of the community regime for the common interests
of the spouses.
274. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2357.1 (Supp. 1979).
275. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1295-96.
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munity property," such as "received by the spouse." Yet, a partition
of community property, voluntary or judicial,27 is contemplated.
Another purpose of article 2357.1 is to insulate property of the
assuming spouse from seizure by separate creditors of the other. In
article 2357 no distinction is drawn between creditors (separate or
community) who may seek satisfaction from property of the former
community, which is consistent with the rules governing the regime
during its existence.277 However, by an express assumption the
following occurs: the assuming spouse (1) limits the responsibility of
his share of former community property to one-half of each com-
munity obligation of the other; (2) the separate property of the
assuming spouse also becomes responsible; and (3) separate creditors
of the other spouse may no longer seek satisfaction of their obliga-
tions from property of the assuming spouse. Professor Bilbe com-
ments on such a result as follows:
[It] would encourage voluntary partitions and at the same time
provide reasonable protection for common interest creditors. It
would, however, affect the rights of those creditors whose trans-
actions were not incurred for the common interest. In the case
of antenuptial creditors, this treatment is particularly ap-
propriate, and in the case of a separate debt incurred during the
marriage, it is justifiable."'
In our hypothetical situation, if W after the voluntary partition
expressly assumes responsibility for obligations under article 2357.1,
she thereby insulates the house from seizure by A, an antenuptial
creditor of H. But, she also assumes personal responsibility to B, a
community creditor (obligation incurred by H for the interest of the
other spouse- " W") for one-half the debt to B. She remains responsi-
ble to the persons with whom she contracted prior to the dissolution
of the community, ie., C and D, for the entire amount of their
claims.2 19 Payment of the one-half of the debt to B would insulate
W's property from execution even if H failed to pay the remainder.
If H did not assume responsibility under article 2357.1, he would re-
main liable to A and B for the whole amount and to C and D to the
extent of the assets of the former community or their value.2'0 If H
276. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1294. See subsection entitled Rights Between Spouses on
Dissolution, infra.
277. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2345 (Supp. 1979) provides: "A separate or community
obligation may be satisfied during the community property regime from community
property and from the separate property of the spouse who incurred the obligation."
278. Bilbe, supra note 234, at 431.
279. A similar situation resulted under the old articles of the Civil Code when the
wife accepted the community unconditionally. The husband remained responsible for
the whole amount of the community debts and the wife for one-half of the community
obligations. Comment, supra note 265, at 610 n.38.
280. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2357 (Supp. 1979).
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did assume responsibility under article 2357.1, he would remain
liable to A and B for the whole amount and to C and D, each, for
one-half of their respective claims.
Despite a proposal requiring recordation of the express assump-
tion, article 2357.1 contains no such provision. Thus, under the
legislation, an assumption can be executed unilaterally at any time,
and the possibilities of fraud by pre-dating the assumption do exist.
Parallel problems involving the wife's acceptance of the community
under our former laws governing the community of acquets and
gains,"8' do not serve as a model for the express assumption contained
in the new legislation. For, upon dissolution of the community, the
wife's creditors formerly were given the right to attack a fraudulent
renunciation by her, 8' accept a succession of their debtor,283 or, if the
delay for deliberating had passed, '84 creditors of the community
could compel her to decide whether she accepted or rejected the
community. 88 All of these articles, which deal comprehensively with
rights of creditors upon dissolution of the community, have been
repealed, with one exception-the oblique action.
By the oblique action, ' a creditor may exercise a right of his
debtor, when the debtor exercises the right to the prejudice of the
creditor. Article 1990 refers specifically to acceptance of an in-
heritance, yet it has a cross-reference to Civil Code article 2421,
which allowed a wife's creditors to attack a fraudulent renunciation.
Since article 2421 has been repealed, 8 ' there may be no direct
statutory authority for applying the oblique action to the express
assumption of responsibility.
If article 1989 is considered as a statement in principle of the
right of a creditor to maintain the oblique action,288 creditors on
dissolution of the community may find the action profitable against
the spouse whose mate contracted heavy debts. In such a case, it
281. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2410-22 (repealed 1979); LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1032-40 & 1050;
LA. R.S. 9:2821 (1950) (repealed 1979).
282. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2421 (repealed 1979).
283. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1990 provides:
In case the debtor refuse or neglect to accept an inheritance to the prejudice
of his creditors, they may accept the same, and exercise all his rights in the man-
ner provided for in the title of successions, and they are authorized, by virtue of
the action given by this section, to exercise all the rights existing in favor of the
debtor for recovering possession of the property to which he is entitled, in order
to make the same available to the payment of their debts.
284. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1050; LA. CIv. CODE art. 2419 (repealed 1979).
285. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1055; LA. CIv. CODE art. 2414 (repealed 1979).
286. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1989-92.
287. 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 1, repealing LA. CIV. CODE art. 2421.
288. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1989-92.
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could be advantageous to a creditor of one spouse to expressly
assume responsibility for one-half the community obligations of the
other spouse. 8 9 The advantage to be obtained is reduction of com-
petition over the assets of his debtor. Yet, articles 1991-1992 suggest
that there are certain rights of the debtor which are considered too
personal to be asserted by the creditors-i.e., separation of property
between husband and wife. The enumeration has been held by an ap-
pellate court to be illustrative," not exclusive. Furthermore, the
creditor would not simply be obtaining property to which the debtor
was entitled, the purpose of the oblique action, but would also be
assuming on behalf of his debtor a personal liability, which is con-
trary to general contractual principles." 1 In the comparable situation
in which a creditor accepts an inheritance of his debtor, he does so
with benefit of inventory, incurring no personal responsibility for
the heir."' From the foregoing, it seems that a creditor may not by
the oblique action assume responsibility on behalf of his debtor
under article 2357.1.
Possibly available to a creditor is the revocatory action
established in Civil Code articles 1970-1994 which allows him to
avoid prejudicial acts of his debtor."' To be successful, the creditor
must prove that the debtor is insolvent, that he has a judgment
against the debtor, and that the assumption of responsibility under
article 2357.1 was in fraud of his rights.2' Although the articles
which precede article 1989 are restricted to contracts of a debtor,
the article itself refers to the unilateral renunciation of a succession
and "any other act of this kind" which would involve the debtor's
right to property. But the creditor who will in almost all cases be
prejudiced by an assumption is the creditor of the non-assuming
spouse. The articles on the revocatory action only contemplated the
exercise of the action by a creditor of the debtor."' Yet, the drafters
289. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1989.
290. Succession of Henican, 248 So. 2d 385 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 259 La.
756, 252 So. 2d 454 (1971).
291. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1889.
292. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1074.
293. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1968-94. There are three elements of proof in an action to
annul a contract of one's debtor: (1) that the debtor is insolvent; (2) that the creditor
has obtained a judgment against his debtor or the action to annul is combined with
that for liquidating the debt; and (3) that the contract is in fraud of the creditor's right.
294. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1968-94.
295. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1969 provides:
From the principle established by the last preceding article, it results that
every act done by a debtor with the intent of depriving his creditor of the even-
tual right he has upon the property of such debtor, is illegal, and ought, as
respects such creditor, to be avoided. This can be done in the mode and under the
circumstances set forth in the following rules.
(Emphasis added.)
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of the Civil Code at the time of its adoption did not contemplate that
a spouse by the contract of marriage would be responsible to a
creditor of the other spouse out of certain property (assets of the
former community), with no personal responsibility."' Without the
availability of this remedy, neither the separate creditors nor com-
munity creditors of the non-assuming spouse can do anything to pre-
vent the express assumption. Perhaps that is as it should be.
If the express assumption is an integral part of the voluntary
partition, it would follow that under certain circumstances the con-
tract of partition is subject to the revocatory action. Usually, the ex-
press assumption will be combined in a partition, for without a parti-
tion there is no share of the community property to insulate. If the
express assumption is executed before the partition, the property is
that of the former community and subject to satisfaction of the
other spouse's obligations, whether community or separate. Even if
both expressly assume responsibility under article 2357.1 before a
voluntary partition, the same result follows."' Thus, the only effect
of assumption before partition is the additional liability incurred by
the assuming spouse. Therefore, there is nothing to be gained by an
express assumption executed before a partition.
Although there is no general recordation requirement for the ex-
press assumption, it is arguable that such a written act must be
recorded to affect immovable property. "8 As to movables, however,
there is no recordation requirement. If after a voluntary partition,
for example, movables of the former community are seized by a
separate creditor in the possession of the non-debtor spouse, the
spouse could produce a written assumption dated one week before
seizure. How could the creditor, who by virtue of the assumption
has no right to seize the property of the non-debtor spouse, prove it
was actually executed after seizure of the property and pre-dated?
By remedial legislation in 1980 imposing a recordation requirement,
this particular problem could be solved.
Administration of the Community or Special Commissioner
A third alternative upon dissolution was considered by the
296. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2345 & 2357 (Supp. 1979).
297. There is the possibility that under article 2357.1, if a spouse had all of the
community property in his possession and executed the express assumption, then he
could sell it all without further responsibility to separate creditors of the other spouse.
However, the spouse assuming the responsibility would still be liable to the other
spouse, as co-owner, for his one-half interest in the community property disposed of.
Furthermore, the separate creditors of the other spouse might be able to assert the
right accorded to their debtor against his co-owner by the oblique action. See LA. CiV.
CODE art. 1989.
298. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2265.
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legislature, enacted in 1978, and repealed in 1979. It was proposed
that either spouse could petition for an administration of the com-
munity property."' The remedy was even available to a spouse prior
to dissolution, if a suit were pending which would result in termina-
tion of the community.0 0 As originally contemplated, the administra-
tion was a mechanism to be resorted to in instances in which the
couple could not agree on the division of the property or when
necessary to insure an orderly liquidation of the community. It was
hoped that the introduction of a neutral person into the acrimonious
dissolution of a community would accomplish a more just result than
the potentially destructive injunctive procedure. 0 1
Utilizing the pattern of the administration of a succession, there
were specific provisions for the priority of payment of secured
creditors;"' then, payment of unsecured creditors, whether separate
or community;30 and finally, appropriate adjustments and reim-
bursements between the spouses.1 Thereafter, the administrator
was required to divide the remainder equally between the two
spouses.' 5 The administration did not affect personal responsibility
of a spouse to a creditor; it only determined how funds were to be
applied to obligations.' Secondly, it did not suspend execution by a
creditor against separate property of the debtor spouse."7 As Pro-
299. LA. R.S. 9:2851 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979).
300. LA. R.S. 9:2851 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979) provided:
Upon dissolution of the community regime, or pending a suit that may result
in its dissolution, either spouse may petition for an administration of the com-
munity property in the manner provided in the Louisiana Code of Civil Pro-
cedure. After the filling of this petition no execution shall issue against any com-
munity property, except for the enforcement of conventional mortgages or
pledges.
301. LA. CIv. CODE art. 149, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 711, § 1; LA. CODE
Civ. P. art. 3944. The 1979 amendment to Civil Code article 149 makes it potentially
less damaging because the injunction need not restrain the alienation of all community
property, but only specific things. 1979 La. Acts, No. 711, § 1.
302. LA. R.S. 9:2852(B) (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979) provided: "Secured creditors
shall be paid with priority from the proceeds of the secured property; any balance due
shall be paid to them as unsecured creditors."
303. LA. R.S. 9:2852(C) (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979) provided:
Each unsecured creditor shall be paid in the proportion that his claim bears
to the total obligations of both spouses. Claims of one spouse against the other for
reimbursement as hereinafter provided, or for damages for fraud or bad faith in
the management of community property, are excluded from the obligations under
this Paragraph.
304. LA. R.S. 9:2852(D) (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979) provided: "After satisfaction of
all obligations, each spouse is entitled to one-half the assets remaining except to the
extent that reimbursement and adjustments are due between the spouses."
305. LA. R.S. 9:2852 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979).
306. Bilbe, supra note 234, at 410.
307. LA. R.S. 9:2851 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979). For the text of section 2851, see
note 300, supra.
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fessor Bilbe observed, "[Pirotection of the interest of creditors
seems only to require a reasonably expeditious and cost conscious
process."3 8 Under Act 627, the provision authorizing an administra-
tion would not become effective until there were procedural rules
enacted to implement it."°9
In House Concurrent Resolution No. 232, the Louisiana Law In-
stitute was directed to study "the equal management" Act and draft
proposals which it deemed necessary to achieve the policy objec-
tives of that legislation. 10 In response to that directive, the Institute
proposed at the 1979 legislative session procedural articles im-
plementing the administration of community concept embodied in
Act 627.1" During the initial stages of the legislative process, opposi-
tion surfaced to this administration concept. In an effort to avoid
jettisoning the entire matrimonial regimes revision, the ad-
ministrator was abandoned in favor of a special commissioner,
whose responsibility would be to assist the court in the partition of
community property. By a House floor amendment to House Bill No.
798 and No. 801, the special commissioner was substituted for the
administrator. 2
Under the proposed Code of Civil Procedure articles, after a
joint petition was filed requesting the appointment of a special com-
missioner, the judge was mandated to appoint one.31 If a petition
were filed by only one spouse, after a hearing the judge would ap-
point a special commissioner if he deemed it necessary to identify
the assets and liabilities of the community and divide the community
property. " ' Imposed upon the special commissioner was the duty of
locating, identifying, listing, and valuing all assets and liabilities of
the former community." ' In the performance of his duties, the com-
missioner was specifically authorized to use discovery devices.1 The
308. Bilbe, supra note 234, at 432.
309. 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 9.
310. For the text of Concurrent Resolution No. 232, see note 3, supra.
311. La. H.B. No. 801 (engrossed version), 5th Reg. Sess. (1979).
312. La. H.B. No. 801 (reengrossed version), proposed LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4751,
5th Reg. Sess. (1979), read as follows: "During the pendency of an action that may
result in the termination of the community property regime, either spouse may peti-
tion for the appointment of a special commissioner for the purpose of assisting the
court in the dissolution and partition of the community."
313. La. H.B. No. 801 (reengrossed version), proposed LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4752,
5th Reg. Sess. (1979).
314. La. H.B. No. 801 (reengrossed version), proposed LA. CODE Civ. P. arts.
4752-53, 5th Reg. Sess. (1979).
315. La. H.B. No. 801 (reengrossed version), proposed LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4757,
5th Reg. Sess. (1979).
316. La. H.B. No. 801 (reengrossed version), proposed LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4758,
5th Reg. Sess. (1979).
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commissioner was further charged with the responsibility of effec-
ting a division of the community between the spouses by preparing
a tableau listing community property and obligations and by propos-
ing a division of community property in kind or by licitation or
both."' When the tableau of distribution was homologated, the court
would render a judgment recognizing the ownership, rights, in-
terests, and liabilities of each spouse in the community property and
sending each spouse into possession of his share. 18 House Bill No.
801, incorporating the special commissioner concept, was reported
unfavorably out of Senate Committee on Judiciary A and failed to
gain approval on the Senate floor.
Both the concepts of the administrator and of the special com-
missioner, when compared to the powers and duties of a notary,"9
are somewhat radical. The authority and duties of the administrator
are in fact far broader than those of the special commissioner.
Without any definite proposals to that effect, the concensus of the
Advisory Committee which originally conceived the idea of an ad-
ministrator was that he should have the power to administer the
assets." ' For example, the administrator could decide if it would be
more advantageous for the spouses to liquidate the community by
sale if a going concern producing significant income were involved
or to permit the managing spouse to continue to operate the
business, but be accountable periodically to the administrator. In in-
stances in which an administration of the community property would
be necessary, the Advisory Committee believed that the ad-
ministrator should have flexibility in fashioning remedies ap-
propriate to the circumstances.
The 1979 legislation provides for neither an administrator nor a
special commissioner. However, because the Legislative Subcommit-
tee responsible for this legislation repeatedly endorsed the ad-
ministration of community property, it is reasonable to expect either
concept to be resurrected at a future legislative session.
317. La. H.B. No. 801 (reengrossed version), proposed LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4760,
5th Reg. Sess. (1979), provided: "As soon as possible, the special commissioner shall
prepare a tableau listing the community property, the community obligations, and the
proposed division of community property either in kind or by licitation or both and
debts between the spouses."
318. La. H.B. No. 801 (reengrossed version), proposed LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4762,
5th Reg. Sess. (1979).
319. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1347-81. For an excellent description of the partition-
ing of community property upon dissolution of the regime, see Comment, Judicial
Dissolution of the Marital Community in Louisiana, 49 TUL. L. REV. 167 (1974).
320. It was the intention of the Joint Legislative Subcommittee and the Advisory
Committee that the administrator, as distinguished from the special commissioner and
the notary, have the power to actually administer the assets; whereas, the notary and
the special commissioner simply assist in identifying, valuing, and dividing the com-
munity property.
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Rights Between Spouses on Dissolution, Such As Rights To a Parti-
tion, Reimbursement, and Accounting
Upon dissolution, subject to the provisions of articles 2357 and
2357.1, the spouses are co-owners of the property of the former com-
munity.2 ' As a co-owner, a spouse may exercise the right of an
owner of property in indivision to seek a partition.122 Until either a
voluntary or judicial partition, all the obligations imposed upon
owners in indivision are imposed upon the former spouses.
If the spouses agree to a division of property, they may volun-
tarily partition 21 it after termination of the regime. The revocatory
action is available if the partition is entered into for the purpose of
defrauding creditors.124 Yet, without an express assumption, it is
doubtful that a voluntary partition could adversely affect or prej-
udice creditors. If there were no express assumption of responsibili-
ty, creditors of either spouse could ignore the contract of the
spouses."5 For example, the partition agreement might provide that
one spouse was vested with the ownership of all community assets.
Under Civil Code article 2357, creditors of the spouse who received
nothing in the partition could continue to execute against property
of the former community in the possession of the other spouse. If
there were a voluntary partition agreement containing an express
assumption of responsibility by one spouse in exchange for all of the
community assets, the other spouse's creditors, whether community
or separate, could assert the revocatory action.26 In the latter exam-
ple, since article 2357 is not applicable to afford protection to the
creditors, the revocatory action is their sole remedy.
If, however, the spouses cannot agree as to how the property is
to be divided, either may petition for a judicial partition.2 7 A
simplistic outline of the present procedure for a judicial partition of
community property is as follows: (1) taking of an inventory or
descriptive list by the notary or notaries, which reflects the active
mass; 8 (2) calculating deductions; 29 and (3) an equal division of the
remaining assets.3 As to the division of the community assets, the
321. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2336 (Supp. 1979), and comments thereto.
322. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1289. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 1308 which provides: "The
action of partition will not only lie between co-heirs and co-legatees, but between all
persons who hold property in common, from whatever cause they may hold in
common.
323. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1294.
324. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1970-94.
325. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2357 (Supp. 1979).
326. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1970-94.
327. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1294 & 1307.
328. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1355-56.
329. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1359.
330. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1364-67.
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judge orders whether the community property is subject to parti-
tion in kind"' or by licitation; 3 ' the judge is to be guided by the
statutory directive that partitions in kind are favored.3 Under the
Civil Code, the judge is accorded discretion in allotting to co-owners
their respective shares.8 '
Comment (a) to article 2336 states that the spouses' co-
ownership is subject to the provisions of the Act governing termina-
tion of the regime, rather than the general rules of the Civil Code
governing judicial partition. Article 2357 is the provision which
allows pre-dissolution creditors to satisfy their obligations from prop-
erty of the former community or separate property of their debtor.
Mention is made in the same comment to article 2336 that the
spouses may voluntarily partition the community "without prejudice
to rights of third persons." Nothing, however, is said concerning the
possibility of judicial partition, nor the extent to which the articles
on judicial partition should apply. For what reason should the
spouses be prevented from seeking a judicial partition of the com-
munity property, if they cannot agree? It would be patently unfair
to deny judicial partition in an instance where one spouse occupied
the home and the other spouse had no remedy other than partition
to assert rights to the property."5 To deny judicial partition in such
circumstances may bestow upon the spouse left in possession a
superior bargaining position in the negotiation of a voluntary parti-
tion. Judicial partition must remain a remedy available to the
spouses upon termination. Under the articles of the Civil Code
governing the right to a partition, it is doubtful that the spouse
could legally be denied the remedy." 6 The difficult questions which
remain concern the application and the interrelationship of the ar-
ticles on judicial partition and those on termination under Act 709.
Among the Civil Code articles governing partition, no provision
authorizes specifically the payment of unsecured creditors as a part
of the proceedings. There is protection afforded for both
unsecured3 7 and secured creditors3 ' during the partition pro-
331. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1337 & 1345-56.
332. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1339-40.
333. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4607. See, e.g., Babineaux v. Babineaux, 237 La. 806, 112
So. 2d 620 (1959).
334. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1364-67.
335. See Cooper v. Cooper, 303 So. 2d 319 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974), and cases cited
therein.
336. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1289-414.
337. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1337 provides:
Each of the coheirs may demand in kind his share of the movables and im-
movables of the succession; but if there are creditors who have made any seizure
or opposition, or if a majority of the coheirs are of opinion that the sale is
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ceedings. The unsecured creditors who do not make an opposition 89
are protected by a proportionate distribution of the "passive" debts
among the heirs."" Likewise, at dissolution of the community, the
husband and wife, in the partition of the "effects" (assets), were
equally liable for their share of the community debts."'
Therefore, upon dissolution of the community, whether by death
or some other cause, it was unnecessary to provide for the payment
of unsecured creditors as part of the partition. Instead, they were
protected by division of the debts. Through the jurisprudence,
however, the principle was developed that the ownership which
vested in the spouses at dissolution of the community was not
perfect ownership of an undivided one-half, but vested ownership
subject to the payment of the community debts.84 What vested in
the spouses was co-ownership of the residuum after payment of com-
munity creditors. Thus, the notary appointed to effect the partition
had to ascertain the community debts so as to divide the residuum.
By application of this principle, the judiciary preferred the payment
of community creditors from community assets over the payment of
the spouses' separate creditors. 43
Under Act 709, each spouse owns a present undivided one-half
interest in the community,u" not in the residuum after payment of
community creditors. The principle which evolved jurisprudentially
to prefer community creditors over separate creditors at termina-
tion has been legislatively repudiated. Further evidence of
legislative repudiation appears in the form of article 2357, which
fails to distinguish at dissolution, in either the first or second
paragraphs, separate creditors from community creditors. 45 Thus,
the principle that also served as the theoretical basis for the pay-
ment of unsecured community creditors during the partition pro-
ceedings has been legislatively overruled.
Unsecured creditors' rights remain the most difficult issue in
necessary in order to satisfy the debts and charges of the succession, the
movables shall be sold at public auction, after the usual advertisements.
See Comment, supra note 265.
338. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1338.
339. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1337. Articles 1289-414, governing partition, appear in book
three, title one, chapter twelve, entitled "Of the Partition of Successions."
340. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1371.
341. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2409 (repealed 1979).
342. See, e.g., Neal v. Lapleine, 48 La. Ann. 424, 19 So. 261 (1896); Newman v.
Cooper, 46 La. Ann. 1496, 16 So. 481 (1894); Landreneau v. Cesar, 153 So. 2d 145 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1963).
343. See Newman v. Cooper, 46 La. Ann. 1485, 16 So. 481 (1894); Comment, supra
note 265.
344. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2336 (Supp. 1979).
345. For the text of article 2357, see note 230, supra.
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the application of the articles on judicial partition to termination of
the community regime. Under Civil Code article 2357, unsecured
creditors would be protected if the partition is in kind. 8" In such a
case, there is no reason why the unsecured creditor should not be
permitted to seize property of the former community in satisfaction
of his obligation. Thus, the articles governing termination of the
regime should apply if the partition is in kind, rather than any con-
trary provision regulating judicial partition, as comment (a) to arti-
cle 2336 suggests.
However, if the partition is by licitation, does the first or second
paragraph of article 2357 apply? If community property is sold to ef-
fect the partition, does that "disposition" impose personal liability
on each spouse for obligations incurred by the other to the extent of
the value received by each? Personal responsibility is assumed by a
spouse when the property of the former community has been disposed
of other than for the payment of community obligations. If the
judicial sale to effect the partition is not a "disposition," the creditor
must trace the funds received and their subsequent disposition. In a
partition by licitation, the alternative to applying article 2357 would
be to include the payment to unsecured creditors as part of the pro-
ceedings. If the community assets are sufficient to satisfy all the
creditors of the spouses, payment to the creditors as part of the par-
tition proceedings is preferable. If there are not enough community
assets to pay all the creditors of the spouses, are they all, whether
separate or community creditors, paid ratably? Ratable distribution
of the proceeds from the sale of community assets was the solution
of the Subcommittee in the proposed Civil Code articles governing
administration of the community property at termination." 7 One of
the reasons for not distinguishing community from separate
creditors in the administration provisions was that no distinction
was made during the legal regime.34s Therefore, the creditor should
not be adversely affected by termination of the regime, a policy
reflected in article 2357. In case the community assets are insuffi-
cient to satisfy all debts, payment ratably to all the creditors could
be ordered. Then, the creditor could proceed against his debtor's
separate property for satisfaction of the balance of the in-
debtedness.
Some other problems exist in adapting the articles on judicial
partition to termination of the community-ie., calculating the ac-
346. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1337 & 1339-44.
347. See LA. R.S. 9:2851-52 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979); La. H.B. No. 801 (engrossed
version), 5th Reg. Sess. (1979).
348. LA. R.S. 9:2841 (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979). See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2345 (Supp.
1979).
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tive mass"" and the deductions 8 0 Article 1359 contemplates an ac-
counting between the "community" and the individual spouses when,
for example, separate property has been used to satisfy a community
obligation. Under article 2358, the liability for reimbursement is not
expressed in terms of a right of one spouse against "the community"
and vice versa. The right to reimbursement is against the other
spouse.' Theoretically, the distinction is consistent with rejection of
"the community" as an entity separate from the spouses. Further-
more, many claims for reimbursement between the spouses may ac-
crue after such a partition if there are unpaid creditors. 52
Obviously, not enough legislative attention was focused upon the
interplay of the two articles regulating the rights of creditors at ter-
mination and the general provisions on judicial partition.', Even
more comprehensive study is necessary concerning the interrelation-
ship of articles 2357 and 2357.1 and the articles governing the ad-
ministration of successions. Although at public hearings the opinion
was expressed that the articles on successions would apply if the
community is dissolved by death,85  no scheme is provided
delineating the applicability of the various interrelated provisions.
Without detailed examination of the pertinent procedural articles on
successions, it is apparent that creditors are accorded different
rights under the succession articles"" than those provided by ar-
ticles 2357 and 2357.1.
Reimbursement
The right of reimbursement upon termination of the community
is the major vehicle for adjusting claims between spouses.
Although there previously had been only one article in the Civil
Code on reimbursement,857 several appear in Act 709.1" Basically, the
349. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1356.
350. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1359.
351. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2358 (Supp. 1979) provides: "Upon termination of a com-
munity property regime, a spouse may have against the other spouse a claim for reim-
bursement in accordance with the following provisions."
352. See text at notes 356-68, infra.
353. Examination of comparative materials provides some guidance as to the
satisfaction of unpaid creditors at dissolution. See W. REPPY & W. DEFUNIAK, COM-
MUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 384-86, 435 n.1 & 464-65 (1975).
354. On numerous occasions during Joint Legislative Subcommittee hearings dur-
ing 1977-79, members of the Subcommittee and Advisory Committee opined that the
administration of succession articles would apply if the community were terminated by
death.
355. See LA. CODE CIv. P. arts. 3241-49 & 3301-08. See generally LA. CODE CIV. P.
arts. 3081-159.
356. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2358 (Supp. 1979).
357. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2408 (repealed 1979).
358. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2358-68 (Supp. 1979).
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new articles attempt to legislate the jurisprudential applications of
article 2408. However, the new articles do differ from their
predecessor in the measure of reimbursement. Previously, under ar-
ticle 2408, reimbursement due a spouse was one-half the enhanced
value of separate property improved by common labor or expense.
In contrast, under articles 2364-2367, the amount of reimbursement
is determined by the amount of property used or its value. The
policy reflected in the change in the measure of reimbursement is to
treat the advance as an interest-free loan, rather than an invest-
ment. The risk of loss is eliminated, but so is the risk of gain. In one
instance, however, under the new legislation the investment formula
for calculating the amount of reimbursement is retained; if a
spouse's separate property increases in value due to the labor of
either, the other spouse is entitled to one-half the increase in
value.59
Preceding the articles on calculating reimbursement in Act 709
are provisions defining community and separate obligations.' Under
article 2360, as under Act 627 of 1978, the definition of a community
obligation includes one incurred during the regime for the common
interest of the spouses.' The definition in Act 709, however, also in-
cludes an obligation incurred for the interest of the other spouse.
The additional language added in Act 709 significantly expands the
category of community obligations. The practical effect of the expan-
sion in definition is to reduce the occasions for reimbursement when
community funds are used and to increase them when separate
funds are utilized. Under Act 709, as in the 1978 legislation,"' it is
possible for an obligation to be in part community and in part
separate"O'-for example, in the case of an obligation incurred by one
spouse for the improvement of his separate estate, the fruits of
which are community if not reserved as separate. The obligation
would be partially separate and partially community, to be deter-
mined by the extent to which the community benefited.
If a spouse at termination does not exercise his right to claim
reimbursement from the other, his creditors might do so by the obli-
359. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2368 (Supp. 1979).
360. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2359-63 (Supp. 1979).
361. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2360 (Supp. 1979) provides: "An obligation incurred by a
spouse during the existence of a community property regime for the common interest
of the spouses or for the interest of the other spouse is a community obligation."
362. LA. R.S. 9:2852(G) (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979).
363. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2363 (Supp. 1979) provides: "[Aln obligation incurred for the
separate property of a spouse to the extent that it does not benefit the community, the
family, or the other spouse, is likewise a separate obligation." See also LA. CIV. CODE
art. 2360, comment (c) (Supp. 1979), which reads: "Thus, an obligation may be in part a
community obligation and in part a separate obligation of the spouse who incurred it."
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que action." ' It involves a right of the debtor to reimbursement,
which if exercised, would increase his patrimony and thus increase
his property subject to seizure in satisfaction of the debt. To be
resolved is whether or not the right to reimbursement against a
spouse is one that is merely personal to the debtor, and thus not ex-
ercisable by his creditors."' Although a creditor is forbidden to de-
mand a separation of property between husband and wife,"6 a claim
for reimbursement after termination of the community" 7 cannot be
considered analogous to a suit for separation of property.""
Right to Accounting
An additional remedy accorded to spouses on termination by
Act 709 is the right to demand an accounting for community prop-
erty under the control of a spouse at termination. 66 Under article
2369 the obligation to account prescribes three years from the date
of termination of the legal regime. There was no parallel provision
in Act 627. However, an obligation to account for the administration
of community property was imposed upon the husband under prior
jurisprudence. To determine the scope of the obligation to account,
an examination of the jurisprudence is imperative. Because of his
superior position as "head and master" of the community,"' the
court imposed a fiduciary duty on the husband at dissolution of the
community regime to disclose to the wife the existence of community
assets and their value .' But later cases extended this obligation of
the husband to account for his administration of community prop-
erty during the existence of the regime. 7 ' Even though he was
responsible under article 2404 to the wife only if he fraudulently
364. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1989.
365. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1991-92.
366. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1991.
367. The right to reimbursement under new article 2358 is specifically available
only upon termination of the regime. The Joint Legislative Subcommittee rejected the
possibility of reimbursement during the existence of the regime.
368. In Cosgrove v. His Creditors, 41 La. Ann. 274, 6 So. 585 (1889), the creditor
demanded that the value of certain improvements, placed upon the wife's separate prop-
erty during the community, and in part with community funds, be placed upon the
schedule of the insolvent husband. The court held that this demand was analogous to a
suit for separation of property, because the husband could not claim reimbursement
until dissolution of the community.
369. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2369 (Supp. 1979) provides: "A spouse owes an accounting
to the other spouse for community property under his control at the termination of the
community property regime. The obligation to account prescribes in three years from
the date of termination of the community property regime."
370. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2404 (repealed 1979).
371. Pitre v. Pitre, 247 La. 594, 172 So. 2d 693 (1965), and fiduciary duty cases cited
therein.
372. See, e.g., Hodson v. Hodson, 292 So. 2d 831 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974).
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disposed of property of the community,"' later cases imposed a
fiduciary duty to account upon the husband because of his extensive
managerial powers. Relieved of the burden of proving fraud, the
wife had only to prove that the husband fiduciary received the prop-
erty and "thereafter the burden [was] upon the fiduciary to establish
what disposition he had made of the money or property." 7 '
Under article 2354 of Act 709, a spouse, as the husband was
under article 2404, is liable to the other for fraud or bad faith in the
management of community property. Whether or not this provision
eliminates the more onerous obligation to account for the ad-
ministration of community property during the regime is unclear.
Similar language in article 2404 did not, under the jurisprudence,
relieve the husband of a fiduciary duty to account for community
property under his control during the regime. The official source of
article 2354 cited in the legislation is Civil Code article 2404, but no
comment accompanies the article. However, in a comment to article
2369, there is an attempt to distinguish the obligation to account
during marriage under article 2354 and the obligation to account
after termination. 75 Unfortunately, the comments are confusing. The
obligation "to account" under the jurisprudence meant simply to ac-
count. Under article 2369, comment (c), however, the obligation to
account is equated with accountability "for loss or deterioration of
the things under his control attributed to his fault . .." According
to the author of the comment, article 2369 is the reiteration of the
rule that governs the relations between co-owners under the general
laws of property. Of course, comments are not to be considered part
of the law."' Therefore, interpretation of the language "to account"
in article 2369 should be identical to that of past jurisprudence. If
so, a spouse would only have to prove that the other spouse had
community property under his control at termination, not that the
other spouse was guilty of fault resulting in the loss or deterioration
of the property. Obviously, the difference in burdens of proof is
significant.
373. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2404 (repealed 1979) provided in pertinent part:
But if it should be proved that the husband has sold the common property or
otherwise disposed of the same by fraud, to injure his wife, she may have her ac-
tion against the heirs of her husband, in support of her claims in one-half of the
property, on her satisfactorily proving the fraud.
374. Hodson v. Hodson, 292 So. 2d at 835.
375. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2369, comment (c) (Supp. 1979) provides in pertinent part:
In this revision, either spouse may be required to account for community property
under his control during the existence of the community property regime ....
In contrast with Article 2354, the obligation for accounting under Article
2369 is not predicated upon a showing of fraud or bad faith in the administration
of the community .. ..
376. 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 7. For the text of this provision, see note 239, supra.
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CONCLUSION
Despite the interim study year for the "equal management"
reform of matrimonial regimes, significant unsolved problems re-
main. No resolution was presented at the 1979 legislative session to
continue the study of Act 709 or to monitor its impact after January
1, 1980. Hopefully, those legislators involved with matrimonial
regimes reform since 1977, and others who are particularly in-
terested, will continue efforts to further refine the Civil Code ar-
ticles and provide solutions to presently recognizable problems and
those which may develop after actual experience with the legisla-
tion.
To the credit of the legislature, the reform of Louisiana's
matrimonial regimes laws has received more attention and delibera-
tion than almost any comparable legislation. The process of reforma-
tion began in earnest in 1977, culminating in Act 709 effective
January 1, 1980. In terms of time and effort, all those persons par-
ticipating in the two-year project made substantial contributions to
the final product. Even recognizing the problems which remain to be
solved, the authors believe as does Professor Harry M. Cross, that
"the new scheme will work without major difficulties.""8 7
377. Cross, supra note 194, at 488.
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